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ABSTRACT 
The Hot Struggle Over the Cold Waters: The Strategic Position of the Arctic 
Region During and After the Cold War 
Magdalena Nowak 
The Arctic became a hot spot on the global map and discussion over the cold waters 
became an important issue in international relations. During the Cold War, as it is 
today, the Arctic was a separate area of rivalry between the superpowers. Despite the 
fact that today's debate is based on different issues, including sovereignty over the 
region, potential access to natural resources and the status of international waters, 
there is still a strong military component to the competing interests, as there was 
during the Cold War. 
 
3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Funding for my thesis and my MA studies at West Virginia University, Collegium 
Civitas, and the University of Tartu was made possible by the Transatlantic MA 
Program in East-Central European Studies, an “Atlantis” project sponsored by the 
Fund for the Improvement of Secondary Education of the U.S. Department of 
Education and the European Commission’s Executive Agency for Education, 
Audiovisual and Culture. 
4 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................. 5 
PART I 
Defining the Arctic .................................................................................................................. 8 
PART II 
The Arctic Before and During the Cold War. ........................................................................ 13 
From Aesthetics to Pragmatism ................................................................................ 13 
Recognition of the Arctic’s Geostrategic Importance ............................................... 18 
The Arctic During the Outbreak of the Cold War ..................................................... 21 
The “War of Nerves” in the Arctic ........................................................................... 24 
Cooperation in the Arctic Region ............................................................................. 27 
The United States Strategic Plansfor the Arctic ........................................................ 33 
Nuclear Threat in the Icy Depths and Frosty Lands .................................................. 36 
The Silent War in the Shadow of Star Wars ............................................................. 40 
The Arctic and the Political Struggle ........................................................................ 50 
The Arctic Mare Sovieticum ..................................................................................... 55 
PART III 
The Arctic after the Cold War................................................................................................ 60 
Past, present and future of the Arctic ........................................................................ 60 
Dealing with the Cold War Past ................................................................................ 61 
Geopolitics after the Retracting Ice ........................................................................... 64 
The Arctic Black Gold Rush ..................................................................................... 66 
Who owns the Arctic? ............................................................................................... 72 
How the Local Became Global ................................................................................. 75 
The Russian Ocean .................................................................................................... 79 
The New Cold War ................................................................................................... 85 
CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................... 90 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................................................ 94 
IMAGES LIST ................................................................................................................... 101 
  
5 
 
INTRODUCTION 
On August 2 2007, the Russian polar expedition Arctic-2007 placed a titanium 
Russian Federation flag below the North Pole as a symbolic proclamation of its right 
to undersea Arctic areas and the resources lying at the bottom of the Arctic ocean.1 
The Arctic became a hot spot on the global map and discussion over the cold waters 
became an important issue in international relations. Members of the Russian 
expedition, Anatoly Sagalevich, Yevgeny Chernyaev and Artur Chilingarov, after 
returning to Moscow became national heroes. They were greeted with the greatest 
honors and were awarded the highest state decoration "Hero of the Russian 
Federation".2 Even though the Russian North Pole expedition was a national project, 
it was not a scientific or pioneering achievement, but its representation in the media 
had an important political role. Furthermore, shortly thereafter Moscow announced 
that Russia would protect the proclaimed territories with twelve strategic Tupolev 95 
bombers.3 Those practices invoked an older set of behaviors, designed to make a 
point about Russian national prestige and standing that had become deeply embedded 
in political, intellectual and military life of the Russian state much earlier in the 
twentieth Century.  
The emphasis which Moscow puts on the Arctic region is reminiscent of Soviet 
times.4 Artur Chilingarov, one of the members of the successful expedition to the 
North Pole in 2007 told  the press: “The Arctic has always been Russian.”5 It began a 
vigorous debate about the region, which the media have even pompously announced 
                                                            
1
 Elana Rowe, Russia and the North (Toronto: University of Ottawa Press, 2009) 9. 
2
 Kremlin decree О награждении государственными наградами Российской Федерации 
URL: http://archive.kremlin.ru/text/docs/2008/01/156144.shtml 
3
 Roger Howard, The Arctic Gold Rush: The New Race for Tomorrow's Natural Resources. (London: 
Continuum, 2009) 158. 
4
 Ibid., 15. 
5
 Adrian Blomfield, “Russian explorer mocks critics - with toy bear”, The Telegraph, 7 Aug. 2007. 
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as the New Cold War. However, it is important to understand that the contemporary 
Russian Arctic policy is the direct heritage of the Soviet Arctic policy. While the 
geopolitical importance of the Arctic region is at the center of the most important 
political disputes of the twenty-first century, the significance of its strategic location 
is not a development of the recent years, but is deeply rooted in history.6 
The objective of the first part of my thesis is to examine the role of the Arctic region 
during the Cold War and to oppose the view which puts the Arctic beyond 
contemporary main historical discourse and neglects its role in historical 
developments of the twentieth Century. My analysis will be based on a few major 
questions: Should the Arctic be treated as a separate field of struggle between East 
and West during Cold War or perhaps just a military training or scientific research 
ground? Was the Arctic important because of military factors, resources, research, or 
only as a matter of prestige? Were all the operations in the region therefore just a 
reflection of other major activities and crises in different parts of the globe? Was 
there a real possibility that Washington and Moscow would turn the icy depths and 
frosty lands of the Far North into a nuclear inferno?  
In the second part of my work I want to show how the perception of the Arctic has 
changed since the collapse of the Soviet Union and determine what the contemporary 
situation in the region looks like in the context of global climate change and 
emergence of the new global powers. The main question I would like to answer in 
this part of the thesis is whether the Arctic situation today is a heritage of Cold War 
politics in the region or whether it should be seen instead as a new, separate, political 
issue. 
                                                            
6
 Charles Emmerson, The Future History of the Arctic. (New York: PublicAffairs, 2010) 31. 
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An explanation of the main events and subsequent milestones in the Cold War 
history of the Arctic is crucial to fully understand the dynamics of this peculiar 
conflict, which was significant for international relations all over the globe for almost 
half a century.  In describing the development and changes in strategy towards the 
Arctic during the Cold War, I would like to show how the actions of both sides in the 
Arctic influenced and drove each other and how they were related to other main 
events during the Cold War. Thus the goals of this thesis are fourfold. First of all, I 
examine the roots of strategic thinking about the Arctic of both Cold War 
protagonists. Secondly, I trace to what extent interests in Arctic were a matter of 
prestige and dominance in scientific research in this hostile and unknown 
environment. Third, I analyze actions in the Arctic region along with the other 
incidents around the globe, where rivalry between two blocs took place, to see how 
the Arctic fits in the larger history of the Cold War. And finally, I discuss the 
implications of the different actions in the Arctic region for the rest of the globe.  
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PART I 
Defining the Arctic 
The starting point for understanding the problems of the Far North is to understand 
what exactly is behind the idea of the Arctic. The Arctic can be defined in many 
different ways, but in the simplest understanding, it is the area around the North Pole. 
The name was derived from the Greek word arctos, which means “bear”. 
Nevertheless that name should not be associated with a polar bear. Arctos was used 
to describe the areas lying to the north under the constellation of the Great Bear.7 The 
boundaries of the Arctic region have been described in various ways. In geography it 
refers to the circle bounded by a line on a map marked with the parallel 66º 33' 39" 
North. In biology, it relates to the northern boundary of natural forests. 
Climatological and ecological definitions focus on the July isotherm of 50 degrees 
Fahrenheit. The political scientist will see Arctic borders much further to the south, 
according to the statements and policies of countries involved in the region. 
Meanwhile historians have to meet the challenge of incorporating all of those ideas 
into one coherent narrative, to bring out the essence of its meaning in different 
historical contexts. 
The main obstacle to understanding the region is the fact that there are many myths 
about the Arctic, which causes misunderstanding, misstatements and undervaluation 
of this space.8 Firstly, the area is considered to be completely isolated and 
unpopulated. While the Arctic was a land with its own completely independent 
                                                            
7
 Shelagah D.Grant, Polar Imperative: A History of Arctic Sovereignty in North America. (Vancouver: 
Douglas & McIntyre, 2010), 5. 
8
 Emmerson, The Future History, p.xiv. 
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civilization, it was also one of the key migration corridors over the centuries.9  It was 
one of the most important migration routes to Canada and Greenland, both in periods 
of cold climate, when human movement on the frozen sea was possible, as much as 
in the warmer centuries allowing for transport by sea. Hence the Arctic was very 
important for human civilization and, furthermore, it is crucial for historical analysis 
of the so-called longue durée.10 
Secondly, the Arctic is seen as a pristine corner of virgin land. Indeed, in many 
places, its habitat has been untouched by humans. However, one of the keys for 
understanding this region is to analyze the process of industrialization and every 
attempt to tame nature in this hostile environment. The Arctic is polluted and 
industrialized in many places, and projects of its exploitation and development date 
back to the late eighteenth century.11 The first large-scale urbanization projects date 
from the middle of the sixteenth century.12 It is true that for centuries, most 
Europeans viewed the Arctic as a place unfit for year-round settlement, with the 
exception of the Danish colonization of Greenland in the eighteenth century. 
However, the situation changed with the subsequent discoveries of new natural 
resources, first gold and then gas and oil. 
The third myth, which needs to be explained, is about the immutability of the Arctic. 
The High North is often seen as a place without history, a place which is not subject 
to external influence, a place which does not change over time. And indeed the 
                                                            
9
 The idea of civilization here refers to the Paleo-Eskimo Dorset culture which existed between 500 
BC and 1500 AD, and which most likely became extinct due to lack of adaptation to the new, warmer 
climate of the Middle Ages. Migration here refers to the Norse colonization (Vikings) in the tenth and 
later centuries, their settlement in Greenland and northeastern borders of the North America 
continent. Grant, Polar Imperative 32-35, 44-50. 
10
 Ibid. 
11
 The Russian-American Company, which operated a monopoly trade from Russian North America 
(Alaska) from 1799 to 1867 aimed at large-scale commercial exploitation. Emmerson, The Future 
History, 34. 
12
 Like Abbot Phillip’s building program discussed in Solovki. Emmerson, The Future History, 27. 
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Arctic was not a place where the great events of history took place. However as the 
examples above demonstrate, the Arctic has undergone constant change, although 
until recently, it was much easier to notice this change in the longue durée than over 
a single generation. Climate change over the centuries caused cooler and warmer 
periods, which had its reflection in human movement in the region.13 Since the end 
of the nineteenth century, which is connected with the end the so-called Little Ice 
Age and new technological development, the Arctic underwent a huge 
transformation.14 It was no longer a blank spot on the map, but part of a collection of 
interests in a number of regions, which are increasingly more linked to each other 
politically, militarily and economically. 
One of the main specialists on the contemporary situation of the Arctic region, 
Charles Emmerson, suggests that the main reason why the Arctic is not present in the 
mainstream historical narrative is rooted in an old theory about ancient Greece and 
Rome, which argues that only the right climate is capable of producing culture.15 The 
fertile crescent of ancient Mesopotamia, ancient Egypt, and even ancient Greece and 
Rome themselves, in fact could be used as evidence for that theory, which says that 
the development of civilization in a climate of extreme cold or extreme heat is not 
possible. However this view excludes a large part of Russian, Greenlandic, Alaskan 
and much of Scandinavian culture, which were able to emerge far from the favorable 
Mediterranean climate. Ellsworth Huntington, a geographer living at the beginning 
of the last century and known for his radical views of climate determinism, believed 
that any kind of progress was simply impossible in northern conditions. It just might 
be conjectured whether he would have changed his mind had he seen Arctic 
                                                            
13
 Grant, Polar Imperative, 8. 
14
 The Little Ice Age dates between 1250 and 1850 AD. 
15
 Aristotle believed that good life was possible only in the right temperature zone and Ptolemy 
advanced the idea of climate zones with different levels of suitability for human existance. 
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development during the Cold War, because struggle for the Arctic as an integral part 
of Star Wars and the arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union was 
an enormous driver of change. 
 
Image 1: Major part of the Northern hemisphere seen from the North Pole perspective                                                    
Perhaps due to the influence of these theories of connecting climate with civilization 
it is often assumed that the events considered as important to note took place only in 
the right temperature. Nicholas John Spykman, famous for his uncompromising 
views on geographical determinism, said that “History is made in the temperate 
latitudes.”16 In addition, taking into account the directions of the first geographical 
discoveries, then trade or broader, relations between civilizations and later on in 
international relations it is not hard to notice that they are all based on an east-west 
axis.17 Looking at the globe from a slightly different perspective changes things a lot, 
as in case of the Arctic region (Image 1). Furthermore, most of maps of the World 
                                                            
16
 Robert D. Kaplan The Revenge of Geography (New York: Random House, 2012). 
17
 Suzanne M. Holroyd U.S. and Canadian Cooperative Approaches to Arctic Security, RAND, 1990. 
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usually force us to think in east-west terms and even contemporary scholars often 
neglect the Far North in their research. Robert Kaplan and George Friedman, two 
influential American political scientists dealing with issues of geopolitics, virtually 
omit the Arctic in their work. In his book The Revenge of Geography, Kaplan 
mentions the Arctic region only a few times.18 Meanwhile, Friedman in "The Next 
100 Years" argues that the United States after World War II became the dominant 
force in all the oceans, which in the context of the Arctic during the Cold War is 
clearly mistaken.19  
                                                            
18
 Robert D. Kaplan In his book The Revenge of Geography mentioned the Arctic only a few times and 
just as an example of a place without history and strategic importance. 
19
 George Friedman, The Next 100 Years: A Forecast for the 21st Century, (New York: 
Anchor 2010), 17. 
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PART II 
The Arctic before and During the Cold War 
The Arctic in no longer a cold spot but the “hot spot” on this planet. 20 
Colonel Bernt Balchen 
Pioneer Polar Aviator, USAAF, 1954 
From Aesthetics to Pragmatism 
A place as hostile to mankind as the Arctic strongly affects the human imagination. It 
is a common location for movies and literature. Mary Shelley’s classic novel about 
Frankenstein began and ended on the Arctic Ocean, the main character of Jules 
Verne’s book The Adventures of Captain Hatteras is obsessed with the Far North, 
and even more recently the biographical book and movie “Into the Wild” showed a 
young man whose biggest dream was a great adventure in the wild north. It is not 
surprising, therefore, that the Arctic also stimulated the imagination of travelers and 
explorers. However, the Arctic had to wait for its era of discoveries to the mid-
nineteenth century. At the beginning of the twentieth century the North Pole was still 
one of the least explored and mapped places on earth. It was also one of the last spots 
which had not been claimed by any “modern state”. 
Although to fully understand the contemporary situation of the Arctic region it is 
important to look not only into the relatively recent history of the twentieth century, 
but also into the more distant past. Shelagh D. Grant is of the opinion that the present 
issue of sovereignty in the Arctic is rooted in times of merchants and monarchs 
between 1500 and 1814.21 The Northern Passage has been seen as an important 
                                                            
20
 Text of speech given by Col. Bernt Balchen at the Explorer’s Club in New York, 13 February 1954, 
Balchen Collection, Maxwell ABF, file 186.7053-93, as cited in Carroll V. Glines, Bernt Balchen, Polar 
Aviator, (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1999), 244-45, 297. 
21
 Grant, Polar Imperative p.55 
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trading route, which could have shortened the distance between the Old and New 
Worlds. However, for centuries, maneuvers between icebergs in wooden ships were 
extremely dangerous and only excellent navigators were able to accomplish it. 
Fridtjof Nansen and Vilhjalmur Stefansson, two major figures in Arctic exploration, 
with their discoveries and opinions created the foundation stones of the Cold War 
and contemporary discourse around the Arctic. Even though they were considered as  
aesthetes, they were trying to change an image of the Far North shrouded in 
romanticism and mysticism into a more pragmatic one. Vilhjalmur Stefansson is the 
key figure in understanding Cold War politics toward the Arctic. Already before the 
Second World War, he believed that the Arctic one day would become the 
“Mediterranean of the North”.22 He saw the Arctic as an important route for trade 
and exchange between different regions.23 In the same way as the Mediterranean, he 
perceived the Arctic region as crucial to understanding the development of many 
modern societies. His interests in the north were very much connected with the fact 
that he was a son of Icelandic emigrants and his first research projects were carried 
out in Iceland. Regardless of his motivations, Stefansson had seen the potential of the 
Far North already at the beginning of the twentieth century, which for some has 
remained unnoticed even today. He was of the opinion that “it is chiefly our 
unwillingness to change our minds, which prevents the North from changing into a 
country to be used and lived in just like the rest of the world.”24 
Stefensson, as a Canadian and a U.S. citizen, directed his vision for the development 
and growth of the Arctic to the governments in Washington and Ottawa. While the 
                                                            
22
 Ibid., 214. 
23
 Many polar explorers compared the strategic potential of Arctic Ocean to the Mediterranean Sea. 
William R. Anderson, The Ice Diaries: The True Story of One of Mankind's Greatest Adventures, 
(Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 2008), 57. 
24
 Emmerson, The Future History, 15. 
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United States and Canada remained unpersuaded because of economic crisis of the 
Great Depression, surprisingly Moscow expressed enthusiasm about Stefensson’s 
ideas. In the newly formed Soviet Union, his books about the Arctic gained immense 
popularity. His ideas turned into a huge national project of the USSR, and even 
Stalin, convinced by Stefenssan’s views, expressed the opinion in 1932: “The Arctic 
and our northern regions contains colossal wealth. We must create a Soviet 
organization which can, in the shortest period possible include this wealth in the 
general resources of our economic structure.”25 
The development of its northern and eastern territories was an important goal of 
Russian internal policy already in tsarist times, but took more organized form when 
the country's capital was moved from St. Petersburg to Moscow.26 Explanation of 
Soviet interest in the Far North can be found in the geography of the country. With 
the longest Arctic coastline of all circumpolar countries and most of the major river 
trade routes directed towards the north, one of the main objectives of Soviet 
development plans was the expansion of the Arctic region. Hence the first and 
second USSR Five-Year Plan included the opening of the Northern Passage and 
enabling waterway transport of hinterland goods.27 The importance of the project is 
shown by Stalin's personal involvement and signature on three of the large Arctic 
projects.28 
However, among the factors contributing to the growing Russian interest in the 
Arctic, researchers also point to the increased activity of the Norwegians in the area 
of the Kara Sea and the Barents Sea; transport problems during the Japanese-Russian 
                                                            
25
Ibid., 25. 
26
 After the Communist Revolution of 1917. 
27
 The big Siberian rivers: Ob, Yenisei and Lena. 
28
 The White Sea Canal, the development of Arctic aviation, and the Northern Sea Route; David 
Fairhall, Cold Front: Conflict Ahead in Arctic Waters. (Berkeley, CA: Counterpoint, 2010), 87. 
16 
 
war and the theory of a different outcome of the war with the possibility of a rapid 
crossing of the Arctic ocean; and the loss of land after 1918 in favor of Poland, 
Finland and the Baltic States, hence pushing the country’s center of gravity away 
from Europe. All those subsequent discomfitures could be compensated by northern 
expansion. Hence in 1926 the Central Executive Committee of the USSR 
enthusiastically adopted V.L. Lakhtine’s idea of claiming all the discovered and 
undiscovered lands located between Russia’s northern coast, between the meridian 
32º 04’ 35” East and 168º 49’ 30” West, and the North Pole.29 According to 
Lakhtine, this was the best and the most peaceful way to divide the Arctic region in 
accordance to the international law. Ironically, the same Soviet scholar strongly 
advocated that  the North Pole itself should be a point which belonged to no one. 
In the memory of Russians and the people of Central and Eastern Europe, the Arctic 
is known primarily for the atrocities associated with forced deportations to Siberia, 
which were experienced even by Stalin, and with the system of Gulag labor camps. 
Even though labor camps in the far Siberian north are primarily remembered for their 
function as political prisons, it has to be emphasized that despite of all of their horror, 
in the eyes of Moscow they had a double meaning. They made an important 
contribution to the industrialization of the Soviet Union and the Arctic region, and 
thus to Russian conquest of their own land. Charles Emmerson remarks that for 
Moscow the Russian Arctic has been all of the following: “a place of retreat, a place 
of veneration, a source of national identity, a strategic bastion, a prison, a labor 
camp”.30 
                                                            
29
V.L. Lakhtine “Rights over Arctic, American Journal of International Law” 24, 4. (October 1930), 
703-717.  
30
 Emmerson, The Future History, 26. 
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Image 2: A British wartime poster about the Arctic convoys 
The intensity of Soviet activities in the Arctic region did not diminished during 
World War II, but only intensified. However, due to the ongoing global conflict, 
many of the major events in the region passed unnoticed. The Far North become an 
important place of cooperation between the Soviets and their subsequent allies. 
Initially, during the era of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, they led the German ship 
HSK-7 Komet through the North Passage and provided the Germans a base for their 
submarines in Murmansk.31 Then, after the German attack on the Soviet Union in 
1941, the Arctic became an important point of supply from the Allies, through the 
so-called Arctic convoys (Image 2). In the meantime, to maintain supremacy in the 
region, the Soviets continued their conquest of the Far North and made the first 
successful landing of aircraft at the most distant mainland point of the Arctic. 
                                                            
31
 HSK-7 Komet entering the Pacific Ocean in 1940 caused huge damages to the Royal Navy. 
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However, defense activities in the North during the Second World War were just a 
prognostication of what was to come after the outbreak of the Cold War. 
Recognition of the Arctic’s Geostrategic Importance 
Even though the United States and Canada contained many who were convinced of 
the strategic importance of the Far North and its significance was recognized 
relatively early by some politicians and thinkers, they did not situate the Arctic in 
their policy as early as the Soviet Union.32 In the nineteenth century expansion to the 
north was crucial for the future history of Canada and the United States. It is hard to 
imagine the Cold War fate of the Arctic without the strong involvement of Ottawa 
and Washington. 
After the purchase of Russian America by Washington, and after gaining control 
over the northern territories from the United Kingdom by Ottawa, the U.S. and 
Canada became Arctic countries. These two key transfers of territory were crucial in 
the future relations of these countries with the Soviet Union, and they would be 
sources of the most important geopolitical changes for the future history of the mid-
twentieth century. Due to financial constraints and the distance from the capital, to 
the tsarist government the sale of Russian America was the most reasonable decision 
at the time. However it is now considered a “geopolitical disaster”.33 Meanwhile, 
from a contemporary perspective, for the United States, it was a milestone in their 
history. 
Even though, at the beginning, the purchase of  Alaska was widely criticized, its 
importance was proved during the Second World War, when it helped to build a 
                                                            
32
 General William “Billy” Mitchell, already in the 1920s, supported the idea of Arctic exploration 
with military ships and the establishment of military bases on Greenland and Iceland. Emmerson, 
The Future History, 104. 
33
 Emmerson, The Future History, 61. 
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offensive position on the Pacific Ocean, was a vital source of  natural resources, and 
opened up access to the Arctic Ocean.34 It is also important to note that, until the 
Cold War, Alaska had not been one of the American states. It officially become the 
forty-ninth state on 1 January 1959, after passage of the Alaska Statehood Act. 
However, American and Canadian interest in the Far North during the Second World 
War increased due to their occupation of the Iceland and Greenland, and joint 
building of the first military infrastructure in the Arctic.35 That become an important 
foundation for their future cooperation and at the time brought the attention of 
Canadian and U.S. decision-makers to the Far North. 
The end of the Second World War brought enormous changes in the international 
arena. Among them, probably the most important was the new global balance of 
power. After 1945, the United States and the Soviet Union become the dominant 
military powers in the world and the shortest distance between the two protagonists 
led through the High North. As a result of the new political situation, in a very short 
period of time the relationship between East and West grew into a multi-dimensional 
conflict, whereby the Arctic was transformed from a field of cooperation into a 
demarcation zone only two years after the war. Over forty years of hostility between 
the two blocs dominated and defined international politics and military strategies all 
over the world, including a space with as complicated an international status as the 
Arctic Ocean and its surrounding lands. 
As soon as Washington started to notice the first signs of tensions with the Soviet 
Union, American decision-makers began to see the importance of the Arctic in the 
new light of the changing balance of power. Historians have been arguing for 
                                                            
34
 Grant, Polar Imperative, 271. 
35
 Emmerson, The Future History, 109. 
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decades where the actual origins of the Cold War can be traced. The traditional 
school of interpretation points to the expansionist nature of the Soviet regime, and 
Soviet ambitions to become a global power and spread communism. Revisionist 
historians of the Cold War emphasize American paranoia about Moscow’s policy.36 
There is no proof that the Soviet Union’s interest of the Arctic region before the 
Second World War was directly connected with a geopolitical interest in the region 
and an early stage of rivalry with the West, but what is certain is that Joseph Stalin 
was convinced of the military significance of the Arctic region.37 The main major 
difficulty in the interpretation of the Soviet Union’s different decisions, in the 
context of the Stalin’s policy towards Arctic, according to Geoffrey Roberts is the 
distinction between geostrategic policy goals and ideological goals.38 
Regardless of the Soviet motives to involve the Arctic region in their policy, 
American interest in the region was the direct result of the early stage of the Cold 
War realities and a reaction to the Soviet policy. At the beginning of 1940s the 
veteran polar aviators, explorers and scientists, including the earlier mentioned 
Vilhjalmur Stefansson, the same person who inspired Moscow to direct its policy 
towards the north, were called to assist the U.S. authorities in the creation of a 
specific strategy for the Arctic region, which was recognized as an important 
geostrategic place and the potential scene of military operations.39 (Image 3). Later 
on Stefansson concluded that had “U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt or Canadian 
Prime Minister Mackenzie King been exiled to the Arctic, as Stalin had been, 
                                                            
36
 Melvyn P. Leffler, “National Security and US Foreign Policy” in: Melvyn P. Leffler and David S. 
Painter, Origins of the Cold War: An International History, 2
nd
 ed. (Place of publication: Publisher, 
Year), 15. 
37
 Anderson, The Ice Diaries, 60. 
38
 Geoffrey Roberts “Stalin and Soviet Foreign Policy”, in Leffler and Painter, Origins of the Cold War, 
54. 
39
 Grant, Polar Imperative, 254. 
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perhaps the United States and Canada would have undergone what he described as 
northward surge of development”.40 However, the threat of the attack from the north 
during the Cold War was the major reason for increased American interest in the Far 
North and in the formation of the long-term strategist plans for the Arctic region. 
 
Image 3: Vilhjalmur Stefansson 
The Arctic During the Outbreak of the Cold War 
From 1946 to 1991, the United States and the Soviet Union confronted each other in 
the Cold War, which despite its name started without any declaration of war. Instead, 
it was marked by fierce and tense military and ideological rivalry, which put 
international peace at stake and involved most of the world. Sooner or later every 
corner of the world became involved in the Cold War struggle. Some of them almost 
become flashpoints of another global conflict, among which the most commonly 
recognized are the Korean War and the Cuban Missile Crisis. However, U.S. Air 
Force General Hap Arnold said already in 1950 that “If there is a Third World War 
the strategic center of it will be the North Pole.”41. Thus it might be said that the Far 
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North become much more important during the Cold War than it had ever been 
before. 
It is clear that at the beginning of the last century, the Arctic’s strategic military 
importance was largely underestimated. Most geopolitical thinkers focused their 
attention on Eurasia as the geographic center of world politics, while the Arctic 
remained a marginal issue.42 The first to focus his interests on the significance of the 
strategic position of the Arctic was George T. Renner, when in the 1940s, based on a 
map with the North Pole at the center, he estimated the opportunities and threats 
associated with this new perspective.43 However, the increase of the Arctic’s 
importance is inextricably linked with the development of technology which allowed 
greater exploration of the region. Shortly after the outbreak of the Cold War, in the 
rhetoric of the United States, the High North began to be identified as a “mighty” and 
“important” region.44 Hence, the geostrategic role of the Far North was fully revealed 
during of the Cold War, when it was possible to observe real military and political 
tensions on the polar waters and islands.  
Even though the Cold War never became a real military conflict between the Soviet 
Union and United States, strategists and military leaders on both sides were in 
constant readiness for war in many different parts of the world. In the contemporary 
discourse on the Cold War, the most frequently mentioned arenas of rivalry between 
the two blocs were the European countries and the proxy wars carried out in Asia, 
Africa and Latin America. Studies of the strategy and military installations 
established after the Second World War focus on the Central and Eastern Europe and 
the Mediterranean, while Soviet naval strategists emphasized many times during the 
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Cold War the strategic position of the Arctic region.45 The Far North, the area at or 
above Arctic circle, was equally important in the strategic plans of both world 
powers. 
In many ways the struggle for the Arctic could be compared to the other exploration 
rivalries present in the international arena, like climbing in the Himalayas. Shortly 
after the Second World War European states tried to prove their supremacy in 
conquering the most inhospitable conditions, to bring prestige and glory to their 
countries by ascending peaks of 8000 meters.46 The race for the Arctic could be 
easily placed in the same category, if not for the strong military aspect of those 
activities. On the other hand, the struggle for the Arctic could also be considered in 
the category of scientific competition. Still little known regions of the Far North 
could provide a valuable area of spectacular scientific discoveries, which could bring 
prestige in the international arena. Again, this is only partially true, because of the 
strong military connections of those activities. At the same time an example at the 
opposite end of the globe, Antarctica, shows that for purely scientific reasons it was 
possible in a relatively short period to regulate the international status of the region.47 
An excellent example illustrating the ambivalent nature of the scientific projects is 
the Russian Arctic drifting research station Severny Polus (Russian: North Pole). The 
first station, SP-1, was built before the Second World War in 1937-1938. The project 
was put on hold for the duration of the war only to be revived with new force in 
1950. By the end of the Cold War, 31 Soviet stations had been established in Arctic 
waters, and between 1950 and the mid-1980s at least two were in operation at the 
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same time.48 Even though the project’s stated goals were strictly scientific 
(meteorological measurements and measurements of ice thickness), all the 
information was gathered for military purposes. The postwar defense strategy of the 
Soviet Union is strongly connected with its scientific exploration of the Arctic 
region. 
The strategic significance of the weather stations in the northeastern Arctic was 
obvious also for Washington. Thus, beginning in the early 1940s, the United States 
focused on expanding their number and building radio stations in the majority on 
their allies’ northern territories.49 After the war, it become clear to the United States 
that in the new global situation, they had to cement their presence in the Arctic. With 
forces and infrastructure in Greenland, Canada and Iceland, it was a matter of 
maintaining that presence with the help of adequate treaties. The North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization established in 1949 guaranteed cooperation with the other 
countries in the region. Canada, Denmark, Iceland, and Norway, the most important 
partners for the United States in the Arctic, were its charter members. Thus, as 
Charles Emmerson remarks, by 1950, the whole Arctic belonged to one of the two 
sides of the Cold War conflict. 
The “War of Nerves” in the Arctic 
The politics of the Cold War soon become a vicious circle of mutual fears and lack 
of trust between West and East. The use of the atomic bomb by the United States at 
the end of the World War II changed Soviet attitudes towards Washington.50 From 
                                                            
48
 From 2006 Russian Federation returned to the drifting ice stations of the North Pole project and 
launched new ones. 
49
 Grant, Polar Imperative p.255 
50
 Martin J. Sherwin  “The Atomic Bomb and the Cold War” in Leffler and Painter, Origins of the Cold 
War. 
25 
 
that point one of two Soviet policy principles was the idea of the “war of nerves”, 
which arose from the fear that United States would use nuclear weapons against the 
Soviet Union. Hence Moscow wanted to prove that even though it did not have that 
powerful weapon in its arsenal, it was not afraid to challenge Washington and act on 
an equal basis, also in the Arctic.51 American strategists’ long-term plans towards the 
region and the rapidity of the technological advances found their response in the 
Soviet postwar defense strategy, which included both offensive and defensive 
measures. 
Unlike the Soviet Union, which began the development of its far north even before 
the war, the northern parts of the United States and its allies were very poorly 
developed. Barely populated and without the basic infrastructure, these territories 
were vulnerable to attack. Therefore, the early period of the Cold War significantly 
influenced the economic development of Alaska.52 It became clear that Arctic 
development would be crucial for American security, and some scholars are of the 
opinion that it became “central to the U.S. military’s post-war security strategy”.53 
The military plans originated from the development of a network of weather stations 
and airfields across the Arctic from Alaska to Greenland. This project of Arctic 
development became the key component of the research programs sponsored by the 
U.S. Army. The Cold War military activities had a huge impact on the economic 
growth of Alaska, which cannot be compared to any other circumpolar country 
region. 
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Each country's defense strategy focuses on the protection of their territories. 
However, in the case of the Arctic, the United States needed specific strategic plans 
for the region, which required close cooperation with other countries, especially with 
Iceland, Denmark and Canada, which lay on the shortest route between the two 
superpowers. In the case of Iceland cooperation was established and regulated very 
quickly, regardless the popular opposition from ordinary Icelanders. Washington’s 
privileged position on that small island was grounded with the Marshall Plan aid, 
when Iceland became its largest per capita recipient.54 Historians emphasize 
Iceland’s often underestimated and neglected “key role in the defense of Northern 
America during the war and postwar years”.55 
This small Arctic island for centuries belonged to the Norwegian and later Danish 
monarchies. After the end of the First World War, Iceland became partly 
independent. During the Second World War, with the German occupation of 
Denmark, Iceland fell under Nazi occupation. Just a year later it was taken by British 
and Canadian forces and then the United States officially took over the responsibility 
for its defense. It should be emphasized that this happened before Washington 
officially entered the war. After all those years with foreign forces in the county, the 
Icelandic government did not want to allow a permanent American military presence 
on the island.56 In 1944 Iceland declared its full independence and started to 
negotiate an agreement of military cooperation with the U.S. Army. Washington 
wanted to keep troops in Iceland, since it was a strategic location for monitoring 
aerial and naval activity in the Atlantic and Arctic Ocean. Iceland without its own 
military forces to provide for the security of the state, quickly become a North 
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Atlantic Treaty Organization member. Shortly after the outbreak of the Korean War, 
at NATO’s request, Iceland entered into a bilateral treaty with the U.S., giving 
Washington control of the country’s defense. While Reykjavik now had guaranteed 
security in the turbulent realities of the Cold War, Washington gained air and naval 
bases in the immediate vicinity of the Arctic region.57 
Cooperation in the Arctic region 
The situation was much more complicated in case of Canada and the negotiations 
over almost every joint project with the United States required long and complicated 
discussions which often ended in serious public rebukes, as in 1952 when 
Washington expressed its anxiety that the Canadian government did not have “the 
sense of urgency of the U.S. and appears not as seriously concerned by the Russian 
threat”.58 The Government in Ottawa and Canadian popular opinion were deeply 
concerned about the American infringement of their sovereignty. Talks about 
cooperation in the High North began right after the war and caused intense debate 
over the nature of relations between the United States and Canada. The negotiations 
leading to a final arrangement were widely criticized by Canadians.59 However, their 
negative attitude about cooperation in the Arctic did not found its reflection in 
government opinion and thus in the agreements signed with Washington.60 Without 
any other means to defend themselves, Canada and Denmark, shortly after these first 
agreements, also joined NATO. 
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The United States after the end of the war increased its military involvement in the 
Arctic region, mainly through a projection of airpower. Due to the limited financial 
and military capacity of the two countries, the presence of Americans over the 
territory of Canada and Denmark was inevitable.61 Also from the American point of 
view, even though the primary goal was to protect its own territory, cooperation in 
the Arctic region with other countries was crucial. Despite the fact that from the very 
beginning it was absolutely clear that the bilateral agreements had purely strategic 
and military purposes in favor of United States, the post-war rhetoric usually 
emphasized the joint and the civilian nature of the projects.62 The chosen line of 
rhetoric had two main purposes. The first aimed to appease the Canadian public, 
which was widely against the militarization of the Canadian Arctic and cooperation 
with United States. The second purpose was rooted in the early Cold War realities. It 
has to be remembered that this was still before the official outbreak of the Cold War; 
thus Ottawa and Washington wanted to avoid on adverse reaction from the Soviets.63 
Nonetheless, it was obvious already at that time, as Shelagh D. Grant remarks, that 
“for the U.S. military planners, the prospect of leaving the Arctic unprotected until 
hostilities appeared inevitable was unthinkable, particularly in light of the events 
leading to World War II still fresh in memory. (…)  Arctic equipment must be 
developed and tested, and men  trained in the techniques of polar warfare.”64 
After a long negotiation process, on 28 January 1947 both Canada and the U.S. 
approved the Joint Arctic Weather Station program (JAWS). It provided for the 
construction of nine stations, the largest and the most significant of which was the 
Eureka station (Image 4). Even though the whole project was under civilian cover 
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and both sides denied for a long time the creation of a northern “Maginot Line,” 
clearly the network of the weather stations and airfields across the Arctic was central 
to U.S. postwar military security strategy.65 The weather stations were a foundation 
for a defense system. Thus, at the same time Washington and Ottawa signed the Joint 
Statement on Defense, which became a framework for the North American Air 
Defense Command (NORAD) – the common defense center of Canada and the U.S. 
established twelve years later.66 
 
Image 4: Contemporary Eureka Weather Station 
In the beginning, the presence of the U.S. Army on Canadian territory was very 
controversial and Ottawa was concerned about the increasing numbers of the 
American personnel stationed in the Canadian North.67 The JAWS cooperation 
between Canada and United States, however, initiated numerous of different 
scientific activities in the region, which finally led to an increasing military presence, 
including joint military exercises. Numerous U.S. and Canadian military studies and 
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expeditions were carried out during those years.68 For example, in the late 1940s 
Colonel Bernt Balchen, the Norwegian-born polar aviator, one of the specialists 
working on U.S. strategy of the Arctic region after the war, was recalled to active 
service to conduct Army training in the most difficult climate conditions (Image 5). 
The new experiment was based on the 1937 Soviet project Severny Polus, the idea of 
aircraft landing on ice and creating drifting research stations. Balchen coordinated 
the activities of the 10th Air Rescue Squadron headquartered in Alaska from 1948 to 
1951 and personally carried out numerous American exercises in the Arctic. The 
Canadian Army also conducted military exercises at the same time, but in 
comparison to the American exercises, which seemed to be massive in terms of the 
scale and measures, the Canadians focused just on equipment testing and survival 
techniques.69 
 
Image 5: Colonel Bernt Balchen 
The scientific race between East and West intensified at the beginning of the 1950s, 
when the United States focused their effort to keep pace with Soviet research in the 
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Arctic region. Subsequent U.S. research and military projects in the Arctic caused 
general discontent of the Canadian public. A new problem over territorial waters 
arose, due to the American use of the Canadian seashore, even though Ottawa never 
expressed its official disapproval of those actions.70 Furthermore, in order to 
convince the public of the merits, seriousness and benefits of cooperation in the 
region, in the mid-1950s the U.S. released a documentary movie discussing the 
successful cooperation between the Canada and United States, based on the example 
of the “MSTS Arcitc Operation 1955.” 71 Even though the movie was originally 
produced as a technical film report of the Military Sea Transportation Service, it is 
obvious that it had a strong propaganda purpose.72 However, according to narrator of 
the short film, it was the story of cooperation and co-ordination at all levels, both 
military and civilian. 
The operation was the first stage of the long-negotiated project of the Distant Early 
Warning (DEW) Radar System, which was one of the largest joint military projects 
of Canada and the United States, and contributed significantly to the creation of 
NORAD (Image 6). DEW was built in order to detect the approach of enemy aircraft 
over the polar region and started operating in 1957, even though negotiations over 
the radar project started already in 1952. Time and resources used to accomplish the 
project proved that an attack over the North Pole was considered a real threat to the 
security of North America. And indeed Washington had reasons to be concerned, 
since by 1956 the Soviet Union had sent not dozens, but hundreds of aircraft to 
conduct landings and carry on exploration in the Arctic region.73 The construction of 
the stations was financed by the United States, while Canada obliged to provide 
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manpower. However, even though the stations were managed jointly by personnel of 
both countries, all of them were leased by the United States until the end of the Cold 
War. The first part of the project, as shown in the movie, had as its aim to deliver 
material from Seatlle to the sites where the radar was to be established in three out of 
four areas between Point Barrow and Sheppard Bay, which is less than a half of the 
whole line. The whole system of the DEW line consisted of sixty-three radar stations 
extending from Alaska to Baffin Island. It was one of the most important 
technological developments which showed that even in extremely difficult and harsh 
conditions, it was possible to build and maintain complicated radar equipment. Also 
the DEW line not only fulfilled its strategic purpose, but moreover had a political 
role. Carrying out complicated logistical convoys in the Arctic waters at that time 
also proved the Navy’s capabilities to operate in all oceans and on many different 
types of shore.  
 
Image 6: Distant Early Warning line (black dots) 
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The United States Strategic Plans for the Arctic 
As for Denmark, the situation was quite different. The Danes saw from the very 
beginning vast opportunities to improve their security in cooperation with the United 
States, since their defense capabilities after the war were extremely weak. Therefore, 
immediately after the Second World War, the government in Copenhagen itself 
began to seek a means of cooperation in the new realities. Washington gained the 
right to operate existing defense infrastructure and build new military bases under the 
American and Danish flag.  
 
    Image 7: Map of Greenland 
Image 8: Thule Air Base 
Transformation of the American-Danish cooperation in the military sector is well 
illustrated by the history of the Thule Air Base (Images 7 and 8). The history of 
Thule and its district, their importance on the Greenland map and the complexities of 
the Danish and American relations in the context of that region date back to the late 
nineteenth century. Robert Peary, American explorer of the Arctic, for years 
regarded as the first man to reach the North Pole, created in the district a research 
station and base camp for his polar expeditions. In 1910, the Danish polar explorer 
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Knud Rasmunssen founded a missionary and trade point, “The Cape York District,” 
which also served as a formal intention of Danish colonization of the area. It is worth 
mentioning that Rasmunssen was also the first who noticed that the flatness of the 
land in the area had the great potential for building an airport. However, up until 
1917 the United States also expressed territorial claims to the area, but abandoned 
them after obtaining rights from Denmark to the Virgin Islands. Denmark gained 
control of the area twenty years later, on the eve of the Second World War, when the 
Thule district was formally established.74 
The base was used extensively as an important strategic point during the Second 
World War, but its story casts a shadow on Danish diplomacy at that time. In 1941, a 
year after Denmark was invaded by Nazi Germany, Danish Ambassador to the 
United States, Henrik Kauffmann, independently of the government in Copenhagen, 
signed an initiative “I Kongens Navn” (English: “In the Name of the King”). It was 
an agreement with the United States and designed to protect Greenland against 
German aggression. The "Agreement Relating to the Defense of Greenland," because 
that was its full name, allowed the Americans to establish military bases in 
Greenland.75 It was received with great enthusiasm by the inhabitants of the island, 
but the government in Denmark accused Ambassador Kauffmann of high treason.76  
Immediately after the liberation of Denmark Kauffmann was rehabilitated and his 
decision to sign the agreement was considered to be right. However, the new post-
war government wanted to regain control over the bases, even though they had lost 
their importance, before international opinion recognized new Cold War realities. In 
the context of the JAWS program of the United States and Canada, Denmark decided 
                                                            
74
 Rolf Gilberg, Thule, Arctic Institute of North America URL: 
http://pubs.aina.ucalgary.ca/arctic/Arctic29-2-83.pdf 
75
 Department of State Bulletin, vol. IV, p. 443 URL: http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/paw/206.html 
76
 Bo Lidegaard, A Short History of Denmark in the 20th Century, (Gyndendal, 2009), 155. 
35 
 
to convert the existing infrastructure to a weather station. A joint weather station 
operated in the years 1946-1951, until a new agreement between Washington and 
Copenhagen was signed. On 27 April 1951 the Danish government ratified 
Kauffmann’s agreement, providing the foundation for full-scale cooperation between 
Copenhagen and Washington in the military field. This development was also 
connected with the fact that two years earlier Denmark had become a member of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which made strategic cooperation inevitable. 
The new terms of cooperation allowed the United States to construct military bases. 
Hence, the Thule research station was immediately transformed into an air base, the 
largest in the entire Arctic.77 It is important to note, that this ambitious plan of 
straightening the strategic position of Thule was planned by Colonel Bernt Balchen, 
the same person who conducted the first U.S. military exercises in the Arctic. He also 
directed the construction of Thule Air Base in 1952.78 
The base in Thule had a perfect geostrategic position to become one of the most 
important points in American strategy. Only 900 miles from the North Pole, the 
airbase created for the long-range bombers covered a large part of the Arctic 
territories. Its construction was hidden under the secret code Operation Blue Jay and 
took two years, from 1951 to 1953. This relatively long construction period was due 
to the short Arctic summer season, limiting time available to work to only four 
months a year. Nonetheless, most of the work was done in the first season in only 
104 days. Just the first season of work absorbed enormous resources: 120 ships with 
about 300,000 tons of cargo, 5 personnel ships with about 12,000 people and today it 
would cost about 225 million dollars.79 At the time it was considered the largest 
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military project of the United States since the end of the Second World War and one 
of the greatest scientific and technological achievements in a hostile environment.80 
According to the American propaganda materials from that time “Blue Jay will be 
kept ready for action as long as the threat that made us [the United States] to build it 
exists (...) but perhaps the thought of this colossal airbase has caused them to fault 
their plans for aggression”.81 The scale and significance of the base in Thule is 
perfectly illustrated by its comparison to the geopolitical importance of the Panama 
Canal. The Thule Air Base was used as an example of the American efforts for 
“development and security.”82 
Nuclear Threat in the Icy Depths and Frosty Lands 
To fully understand the Arctic during the Cold War it is crucial to put its discourse in 
the context of nuclear weapons. Until 1949, the United States was the only country 
that had nuclear warheads, but the intensity with which the Soviet Union began to 
work on nuclear power after the American attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki led to 
a situation in which the world was actually faced with the possibility of global 
nuclear war.83 According to some scholars, the chances that a future war between 
East and West would be conducted on a conventional basis on European soil were 
relatively small. Due to technology development, strategic efforts focused on the 
development of the shortest delivery route between the two countries, the Arctic.84  
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Image 9: Nowaya Zemlya 
In 1953, the Soviet Union made another step forward in the nuclear technology, 
conducting the first successful hydrogen bomb test which triggered not only a 
chemical, but also a political chain reaction. Even though, at that time all Soviet 
nuclear tests were carried out in Semipalatinsk in the Kazakh Soviet Socialist 
Republic, on 15 February 1954 Washington, in response to the Soviet tests, decided 
to build the earlier mentioned line of radar stations, which together functioned as the 
Distant Early Warning (DEW) radar system.85 Shortly after this decision, on 7 
September 1954, the Soviets established a new nuclear testing ground. The new site 
was located in the Arctic, on the island Novaya Zemlya, where the first atomic 
charge was detonated a year later (Image 9). The United States completed the DEW 
line by 1957, which together with the Thule air base, was supposed to guarantee 
safety in case of Soviet attack from the north with the use of bombers.86 
Interestingly, those events did not correspond to any of the significant crises of the 
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Cold War. All those activities with nuclear danger in the background, took place 
right after the Korean War and before the Suez Crisis. Therefore, it can be assumed 
that the Arctic strategies of the superpowers went on a path independent of Cold War 
politics. 
The urgent need for innovation, which fueled technological development during the 
Cold War, initiated one of the most peculiar projects in the American military history 
of the Cold War. The secret project Iceworm was tremendous in its scale and in the 
innovativeness of its idea to build a network of mobile nuclear missile launch sites 
under the Greenland ice sheet (Image 10). According to historian Richard Vaughan, 
project Iceworm was inspired by Bernat Balchen’s vision of Greenland as “a gigantic 
aircraft carrier.”87 The aim of the project was to place medium-range missiles as 
close to the Soviet Union as possible, so their range could reach Moscow, but remain 
invisible for the enemy. The project was initiated in 1958, a year after the Paris 
NATO summit took place and when the United States within NATO presented a 
strategic plan on deployment of nuclear weapons in allied countries. The 
Scandinavian countries, including Denmark, in fear of becoming a nuclear battlefield 
decided to become a nuclear-free zone, which prohibited the stockpiling of nuclear 
weapons on their soil in peacetime.88 Thus the Iceworm project would have been a 
violation of international agreement among the alliance members, hence the 
blueprints of the project were kept secret from the Danish government until the end 
of the Cold War. Plans of the project were presented in a U.S. Army report Strategic 
Value of the Greenland Icecap. Even though the U.S. Department of Defense 
officially introduced Camp Century as a research project, it aimed to build a network 
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of tunnels, within an area of about 52,000 square miles, located an average of 28 feet 
below the surface of the ice, where Americans planned to deploy up to 600 nuclear 
missiles at distances 4 miles from each other. It has to be remembered that Iceworm 
coincided with the U.S. deployment of nuclear missiles in Italy and Turkey, which 
led to the Cuban missile crisis. Thus one can only speculate that if those plans had 
come to light then, the outcome of the Cold War crisis in 1962, which threatened the 
security of the whole world, could have been much different. However, back then 
Iceworm was hidden under a big cover project, widely known to the public as Camp 
Century. 
 
Image 10: Camp Century’s plan 
The cover project launched in 1958 and described as a nuclear power Arctic research 
center built to test various construction techniques under Arctic conditions, was 
completed in 1960. Camp Century was a small military outpost built in 1959, about 
150 miles from the Thule Air Base and about 800 miles from the North Pole. It was 
an amazing project with the use of new construction techniques. Trenches dug into 
the ice were covered with steel arches. Inside its tunnels were built housing facilities, 
laboratories, auxiliary facilities, and the whole was built up with bricks of ice. The 
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camp was equipped with a nuclear power plant due to the small efficiency of a diesel 
engine at low temperatures. Problems started only three years after opening the 
outpost. At the time, exiting knowledge of the glaciers was insufficient. Engineers 
did not anticipate that ice conditions were unstable to the extent that they. The ice 
was subjected to such enormous stresses that it turned out that the city under the ice 
collapsed much faster than was originally expected. In 1964 the nuclear power plant 
was removed due to the ceiling’s collapse and just a year later, the outpost was 
completely closed due to the unstable ice conditions. In 1966 project Iceworm was 
cancelled. Interestingly, as Shelagh D. Grant remarks, even to this day Canadians 
and Danes are not aware of the enormity of the actions taken by the United States on 
their territory during the Cold War.89 
The Silent War in the shadow of Star Wars 
Activities in the Arctic were not only independent chapters of Cold War history, but 
they were also part of the aftermath of the whole Cold War rivalry between East and 
West. The late fifties brought an unexpected change in the strategic distribution of 
global forces. Until 4 October 1957, the United States either militarily dominated 
over the Soviet Union, or they were on the same level. However, the tables were 
turned when Moscow launched into orbit the first artificial satellite, Sputnik 1. Space 
projects played a huge role in the annals of Cold War propaganda, but it has to be 
remembered  that their primary role was to gain military advantage.  
The end of the Second World War and the Allies defeat of the Third Reich were also 
the beginning of a quiet war to take over German technology, including one of the 
most innovative achievements of German engineers - the first ballistic missile 
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Vergeltungswaffe-2, commonly known as the V-2.90 Immediately after the war, both 
the United States and the Soviet Union launched rocket research programs based on 
German designs. In the new realities of the Cold War, it turned out that the key was 
not only have ballistic missiles built on the model of the V-2, but in particular 
extending their range so they were able to reach the enemy. 
While Washington began its program of developing intercontinental ballistic missiles 
(ICBMs) immediately after the war, the Russians in the first instance had to develop 
a nuclear weapon and only then could they focus on the development of missiles able 
to reach targets in Europe. Moscow began its ICBM program after improving its 
nuclear technology and conducting a test of the first thermonuclear bomb RDS-6s in 
1953.91 The newly created thermonuclear warhead needed a rocket powerful enough 
to carry it. In addition to their military role, intercontinental ballistic missiles could 
also be used in science. A long distance ballistic missile was able to launch an 
artificial satellite into space. At the same time the launching of artificial satellites 
into space was a message to the other side of the conflict that the enemy had 
effective intercontinental ballistic missiles. Thus, in 1955 the United States 
announced that within the next two years, as a climax to the celebration of the 
International Geophysical Year, it would build a rocket capable to putting an 
artificial object in orbit around Earth. The race for supremacy in space had begun and 
to the end of the Cold War, it was assumed that the space race began two years later, 
but today NASA had confirmed that it commenced in 1955.92 Moscow immediately 
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put great emphasis on the development of its space program, which aimed to 
overtake the Americans and prove Soviet technological advantage. 
When in 1957, Moscow successfully sent into space the first artificial satellite, the 
headlines of Russian newspapers announced the glorious victory of Soviet science, 
and the Americans reacted in a fit of political panic. According to John Piña Craven 
it “vividly demonstrated that we [the United States] were far more vulnerable to an 
attack by the Soviet Union than we had realized.”93 Sputnik proved, as one of the 
American generals remarked in his diaries, “the space race was on, and the United 
States appeared to be stuck at the starting blocks,” but more importantly, it showed 
that Moscow had the technology for an attack with inter-continental ballistic missiles 
for which the United States were not prepared.94 Of course, this success was 
brilliantly exploited and inflated to unimaginable proportions in Moscow’s 
propaganda, which made Washington even more concerned.  
The United States reacted swiftly. Even though the U.S. was not capable of 
constructing immediately an American equivalent of ballistic missiles, it decided to 
change the direction of development. On 10 October 1957, the National Security 
Council of the United States gathered in the White House to discuss possible 
solutions. At that meeting, Undersecretary of State Christian Herter remarked that it 
was necessary to assure U.S. allies that “we had not been surpassed scientifically or 
military by the Soviets.”95 However, the response did not materialize immediately. 
Meanwhile Moscow began preparations to launch Sputnik 2, and the pressure in 
Washington continued to grow. Only one month later, the Soviets launched their 
second satellite and this time they took a living creature to space. Today we know 
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that Soviet propaganda tried to convince the public that the project was successful, 
but in fact Laika died almost immediately after the launch. However, back then the 
United States was shocked by the specter on the Moscow’s technological 
domination. On December 6, 1957 Washington decided to launch its own satellite, 
and the news of the Vanguard rocket project was transmitted over the whole country. 
Unfortunately, the run of misfortune continued for the United States and the 
Vanguard TV3 exploded only two seconds after liftoff. Commentators announced a 
severe propaganda defeat for the United States.96 
To change this situation the United States decided to prove their superiority in 
different pioneering field. In the fifties, there were fewer and fewer places on Earth 
where it was possible to make pioneering exploration achievements. The bottom of 
the Arctic Ocean remained one of the most inaccessible and unexplored places on 
Earth until the building of the first nuclear-powered submarine. Despite the 
development of technology and the space race, the Arctic ice cover remained an 
impenetrable barrier to any ship that wanted to reach the North Pole. 
The idea of reaching the farthest North point by waterway came up already in the 
thirties. However, for reasons of various technical limitations at the time it was 
totally impossible. Nobody could determine the depth of the ice in the shallows of 
the ocean reaches, and therefore there was a risk that a submarine would be trapped 
between the ice and the ocean floor.97 Another problem was sailing near the 
magnetic pole, where the standard compasses became useless.98 In addition, 
conventional propulsion submarines required the use of electricity while submerged. 
Thus to replenish the energy, it was necessary to emerge and launch internal 
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combustion engines to recharge the battery. Until the invention of the nuclear-
powered engine, traveling under the ice, like in a Jules Verne novel, seemed to be the 
unreal dream of a madman.  
When it became clear that the development of submarines was a very important field 
of military development, the United States made every effort to develop this branch 
of its armed forces. In January of 1954 the U.S. launched the world's first nuclear-
powered ship, which in honor of Jules Verne’s vision told in Twenty Thousand 
Leagues under the Sea was christened "Nautilus." The ship was the triumphant 
embodiment of engineers and visionaries ideas. Its performance exceeded that of any 
previous ship, was much faster and much harder to detect. If any ship could sail 
under the Arctic ice, it was just the USS Nautilus. The Nautilus, the underwater gem 
of the U.S. Navy, also became a solution for the technological gap between Moscow 
and Washington. Until 1958 its actions were carried out in the test phase, and it had 
been in use already four years when it became famous all over the world.99 
For many years there was a political reason which stopped Washington from 
increasing U.S. submarine involvement in the Arctic. Already after World War II the 
U.S. Navy abandoned the idea of military exercises that included submarines in the 
Arctic in favor of the waters surrounding Antarctica, due to the fact that having such 
exercises in the Arctic region might have been too provocative for the Russians.100 
Nevertheless, when it became clear that Soviet missiles posed a new threat and the 
Arctic region meanwhile had become a Soviet backyard, the United States was ready 
to change its opinion, even at the expense of political damage to relations with 
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Moscow. In light of the technical achievements of the Soviet Union, Washington felt 
compelled to embrace the new pioneering challenges.  
The commander of the "Nautilus", William Anderson, was entrusted with a secret 
mission, which was supposed to be the answer to Sputnik 1. Anderson was the first 
man in history, who was charged with taking a submarine under the North Pole ice, 
flowing from Pacific Ocean to Portland in Great Britain. This mission received the 
code name - Operation Sunshine I. Many U.S. Navy admirals were of the opinion 
that the mission was too risky and exposed the only U.S. nuclear-powered submarine 
in the fleet, but Rear Admiral C. W. Wilkins, one of the biggest supporters of 
Operation Sunshine I, said, “I believe it is a venture of great promise, in both the 
fields of national defense and science.”101  In addition, American decision-makers, in 
the face of the difficult political situation and the enormous pressure of the public, 
were willing to take the risk. As a precaution, the crew and the commander were 
obliged to maintain strict confidentiality, and Washington refrained from issuing any 
public messages in case of the mission’s failure.102 
The first attempt to sail under the ice was not completed successfully. The icebound, 
shallow pool of the Chukchi Sea effectively blocked access to the deep waters of the 
Arctic Sea. The commander of the ship decided not to risk the jewel of the U.S. Navy 
and abandoned the first attempt. Operation Sunshine I had failed and the Nautilus 
turned back to Pearl Harbor. However, only six weeks later, on July 23 Anderson 
decided to make another attempt and Operation Sunshine II began. This time, the 
captain changed the route and decided to proceed across the Beaufort Sea. This 
decision turned out to be excellent, and on August 3, 1958, exactly at 23.15, the USS 
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Nautilus safely reached the North Pole. Nine days later, on Aug. 12, the ship 
achieved its ultimate goal and came to the English port of Portland.103 (Image 11). 
 
Image 11: Copy of the original radio dispatch with the historic message 
To announce this spectacular success as quickly as possible, near Iceland a helicopter 
picked up William Anderson and transported him to Reykjavik, from where an 
airplane took him to Washington so that he could personally submit a report to 
President Eisenhower, who announced the mission’s success. After the quickly 
organized press conference, the captain returned to the rest of the crew in England, 
so that all together they could reach the base of the Royal Navy in Portland. The 
success was widely publicized in the media, and after returning to the United States 
the crew was welcomed with a big parade. 104 
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It was a major American triumph, which helped Washington to rebuild U.S. national 
prestige. The success of Operation Sunshine showed the United States’ contribution 
to the exploration of the most inhospitable conditions, but also that America was 
back in the technology race in an outstanding way with a military component.105 The 
Presidential Unit Citation contained the following words: “The skill, professional 
competence and courage of the officers and crew of Nautilus were in keeping with 
the highest traditions of the Armed Forced of the Unites States and the pioneering 
spirit which has always characterized our country.”106 It was clearly a military 
message for Moscow, because possession of a fleet of nuclear-armed submarines 
capable of passage through the Arctic Ocean filled the security gap created by 
Russian ICBMs. It carried another signal for the ideological opponent from the East - 
the United States had found a new and fast way which could be used if necessary to 
attack the Soviet Union. Hence the launch of Sputnik 1 had opened a new chapter in 
the history of the Arctic, which might be called the era of the “silent war”, because 
from that moment U.S. submarines could operate undetected in the Arctic, in short 
missile distance from the Soviet Union.107 
To use effectively the military capabilities of the underwater fleet it was necessary to 
know the thickness of the Arctic ice and the shape of the ocean floor. Hence in the 
early 1960s the United States sent a number of secret and very dangerous military 
research missions to deepen American knowledge of this area. In the 1960s with the 
technological advantage and a circle of allies, United States gained unconditional 
superiority over the Far North, but the Cold War was not over and the Soviet Union 
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could not afford to leave the Arctic in the hands of “Western imperialists.” The 
development of submarine forces served to increase research capacity in the Arctic 
region. Ice observations, navigational testing and sea floor mapping were the 
practical contributions in building a new technological balance between East and 
West. 
The advent of ballistic missile technology resulted in the need for constructing a 
radar system that would be able to detect ICBMs. Because of that, already in 1959, in 
the immediate vicinity of the military airbase at Thule, the first Ballistic Missile 
Early Warning System (BMEWS) was installed. To ensure full protection of the 
Arctic region identical radar systems were installed at the Clear Air Force Station in 
Alaska and the Royal Air Force Fylingdales station in England. 
Development of ballistic missiles opened yet another branch of the armaments sector 
development, the construction of guided missile ships capable of carrying and 
launching missiles. The first ships capable of launching a ballistic missile were the 
American aircraft carriers. Thus the first successful launch of a ballistic missile from 
a mobile platform was made by the Americans. The idea of creating a submarine 
which would be able to launch such a missile had been designed already by the Third 
Reich, but for years neither the Soviet Union nor the United States appreciated the 
strategic potential of this type of weaponry and did not show any interest in this 
concept. The Russians had not decided to develop a maritime ballistic missile system 
until 1954, but when they finally did they constructed the world's first submarine that 
carried ballistic missiles. On September 16, 1955, a submarine in the White Sea 
became the first in history of to launch the projectile, on the water’s surface, from a 
submarine. The United States, concerned about this situation, in 1956 started the 
Polaris program, which aimed to develop ballistic missiles capable of being launched 
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from a submerged submarine. After four years of intensive work, on July 20, 1960 at 
12:39 the nuclear-powered submarine USS George Washington for the first time in 
history successfully executed a Submarine-launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM).108 
The increasingly tense atmosphere between the superpowers and the upcoming 
Cuban missile crisis were reflected in the situation in the Arctic. The technological 
race visibly metamorphosed into a global demonstration of military forces. Thus 
shortly thereafter the Soviet Union once again surpassed the United States and 
conducted at Nowaya Zemlya the first test of an armed SLBM on October 20, 1961. 
Nuclear-powered submarines, capable of launching nuclear missiles, were now 
prepared to attack from undetected locations. 
Moscow, quckly marked its presence in the region even more. Only ten days later, on 
October 30, 1961, also at Novaya Zemlya, the Soviets conducted a successful test of 
the most powerful nuclear weapon ever detonated, the Tsar Bomb. This hydrogen 
bomb was about 4000 times more powerful than the Little Boy dropped on 
Hiroshima during the Second World War. It was designed at the special request of 
Nikita Khrushchev to show what the Soviet Union was capable of.109 Furthermore, 
with heightened Cold War tensions between Moscow and Washington, the 
importance of the Thule Air Base also grew. In 1961, the base was enlarged with the 
United States Air Force Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS), the 
reach of which extended to Soviet territories (Image 12).  As a part of the “mutually 
assured destruction” (MAD) strategic doctrine, most of the military projects in the 
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Arctic were not kept secret and furthermore were widely announced in propaganda 
as the Arctic become their most vital arena.110  
 
Image 12: Coverage of BMEWS is shown in red, complementing the coverage provided by the 
PAVE PAWS system in blue. 
The Arctic and the Political Struggle 
After 1962, the major Cold War problems in Cuba and Vietnam drew Washington 
and Moscow’s attention away from the Arctic. The MAD doctrine assured at the 
time a tenuous military balance in the region.111 However, it also required settlement 
of this tense situation, especially in the context of events such as the Cuban Missile 
Crisis. As a result of increasing international complications, already in 1964 the 
leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union expressed a desire to reduce 
nuclear arsenals. After 1965 the United States also reduced its military forces in 
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Canada and Greenland. Shelagh D. Grant connects this fact with the failure of Camp 
Century and deployment of combat units to Vietnam.112 However, in her analysis she 
totally neglects the Cold War arms control treaties. After the first declaration of 
intentions in 1964, Washington and Moscow began negotiations over arms control 
treaties. 
Even though the Cold War rivalry seemed to soften and was kept in check in the 
Arctic, the Soviet Union did not throw in the sponge, and continued its struggle for 
dominance of the region. When Leonid Brezhnev came to power in 1964, the 
Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union, Sergey Gorshkov, gained his permission to 
oversee a massive naval build-up. Gorshkov was a visionary who believed that “all 
modern great powers are maritime countries.”113 The period of Leonid Brezhnev’s 
rule was characterized by intense Soviet military expansion, which was also reflected 
in the military development of the Soviet Arctic. Thus by the 1970s Soviet 
submarines, including ballistic missile submarines (SLBN), covered all of the Arctic 
area and their numbers significantly increased. Moreover, the improvement of the 
Kola Peninsula’s infrastructure raised the profile of the Soviet Arctic.114 At the same 
time the United States decided to downsize its forces in Canada and Denmark. The 
reduction of the American forces in the Arctic region, according to some historians, 
can be attributed to the failure of Camp Century or, what is more likely, to the 
deployment of combat units to Vietnam that year. Another factor that could have 
affected this change was the escalating space race. In the mid-sixties, both powers 
laid great emphasis on the development of their lunar programs. However, 
simultaneously with the reduction of the forces in Greenland and the Canadian 
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North, the arsenal and military personnel of Alaska had not decreased.115 Washington 
was still aware of the importance of the Arctic. 
In the late sixties the situation in Greenland became complicated for the United 
States. Although initially, right after the war, the Danes construed the government’s 
decision on cooperation with the United States as an opportunity for mutual benefit, 
the end of the sixth decade of twentieth century brought a significant crisis in 
relations between Copenhagen and Washington. On January 26, 1968 the strategic 
bomber B-52 armed with four hydrogen bombs caught fire and crashed just seven 
miles from the base at Thule. The fire caused the explosion of one or more nuclear 
warheads and resulted in the crashing of the aircraft together with the bombs that had 
not been ruptured by the heat. Right after the accident a special crew was sent in 
order to identify the crash site, find potential survivors and remove remains and 
traces of the plane. After over nine months and with the help of 700 people and a 
mini-submarine, the contaminated material, including snow and ice from the crash 
site, had been removed.116 As a consequence of the accident the removal of the 
nuclear warheads from all continuous alert flights was ordered. However, 
Washington was accused of violating international treaties, according to which the 
whole territory of Denmark was a nuclear-free zone. The United States rejected the 
accusation, explaining that it was only a routine mission and that the nuclear 
warheads were never deployed on the territory of Denmark. Paradoxically, at that 
moment in history, this statement was true, because after 1965 Washington reduced 
its nuclear arsenal and removed nuclear weapons from its bases in Greenland. The 
Iceworm project back was still strictly confidential, thus Denmark could not know 
that United States had a plan of deploying 600 nuclear missiles in Greenland. 
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However, this situation did put a strain on bilateral relations between these two 
countries and caused a large political controversy.117 
The late sixties also opened a new chapter in the history of the Arctic that should be 
taken into account, the era of gas and oil. In the winter of 1968-1969 at Prudhoe Bay 
on Alaska’s North Slope an oil field was discovered. It immediately led to the 
involvement of the new forces interested in the Arctic region, such as the oil and gas 
industry.118 The high north had become important not only for political and military 
reasons, but also because of its natural resources. Along with the emergence in the 
international arena of new issues of oil and its supply, the issues of environmental 
protection, rights of indigenous peoples, and above all the question of territorial 
waters appeared.119 With the discovery of oilfields in Alaska, the new gold rush 
began and with it a new debate over the High North waters arose.120 This debate 
would become significant to the strategic position of the Arctic region in the twenty-
first century. 
Events of the 1970s shifted international attention away from the Arctic. The United 
States was preoccupied with the final, concluding phase of the Vietnam War. In the 
meantime, a new Arab-Israeli conflict broke out, the result of which was a global oil 
crisis and crisis in the foreign exchange market. In addition, the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan drew international public opinion away from the Arctic. Tensions in 
many different parts of the world were reflected in the strong need for opening talks 
aimed at reducing strategic arsenals. Two rounds of bilateral talks, called the 
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Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), resulted in the signing of two treaties, 
which significantly relaxed relations between East and West.  
However, it did not stop the Soviets from pushing their ambitious plans for 
strengthening their Northern Fleet at that time.121 Moscow, encouraged by the 
success of NS Lenin, the first atomic icebreaker produced back in the fifties, 
commissioned the construction of more Lenin-class vessels. In 1975, NS Arktika, a 
mighty nuclear-powered icebreaker, came into service. The Soviet authorities hurried  
to show the world the opportunities created by the Northern Fleet’s new acquisition, 
hence Arktika was sent to the Far North with a special mission. On August 17, 1977 
as the world's first surface ship, it reached the North Pole.122 (Image 13). 
 
Image 13: Icebreaker Arktika 
However, it was not a completely peaceful moment in history for the Arctic region. 
During this time, the debate over the borders of the territorial waters of Arctic 
countries exacerbated. Also the issue of sovereignty in the Arctic increasingly 
created problems between the U.S and its allies. In the context of the tense situation 
with the United States, in 1973 Canada and Denmark decided to take the crucial first 
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step in resolving potential conflicts between them. The bilateral agreement carefully 
defined boundaries between Greenland and the Canadian Arctic islands.123 At the 
same time it was the first bilateral agreement which defined maritime borders in the 
Arctic region. Reopening of the Station Nord, the U.S. weather station and airfield 
closed three years earlier by the Danes in 1975, also occurred as an interesting 
development at that time. Shelagh D. Grant indicates that this event can be explained 
in the context of sovereignty. It illustrated perfectly to the international community 
that Denmark was gradually reasserting authority over Greenland. 
The Arctic Mare Sovieticum 
In the 1980s, the Arctic again became a vital arena of the international struggle. 
According to Charles Emmerson, at that point the Arctic became a real Mare 
Sovieticum.124 Into the 1980s, under the Brezhnev regime, the USSR worked on 
intensive naval development and construction. This trend did not change 
significantly after Brezhnev's death in 1982. And even though Soviet military 
development seemingly slowed when Mikhail Gorbachev came to power, the number 
of produced ships did not decrease. At this moment, the Soviet Union possessed the 
world's largest force of submarines. Up to 40 percent of all the world’s submarines 
were estimated as belonging to Moscow. And even though the exact number was not 
known to the West at this point, it was calculated that it was about 310 submarines of 
which about 200 were nuclear-powered and the remaining 110 conventionally 
powered.125 The part of the Soviet Navy responsible for the defense of northwestern 
waters of USSR, including the longest and the most inhospitable coast of the Arctic 
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region, the Red Banner Northern Fleet, was considered the most important but was 
also the largest Soviet fleet. About 47 percent of the Soviet Navy’s submarines, 27 
percent of its surface warships, 25 percent of its naval aircraft and about 20 percent 
of its naval personnel belonged to the Northern Fleet.126 However not only its size, 
but also its development, made the Far North a truly Soviet territory.127 The U.S 
Director of Naval Intelligence emphasized that “despite the USSR’s escalating 
economic and social problems, the Soviet Navy had a year of growth in 1989 which 
any navy could be proud.”128 
The United States, which had neglected the military situation in the Arctic since the 
mid-1960s and focused on a struggling economy and territorial issues with their 
closest neighbors, had to take a number of modernization measures to re-strengthen 
its position in the region in 1980s. In 1982 the Thule Airbase was transformed into 
the Air Force Space Command Base. In practice it meant that the main objective of 
the base was changed into a more defensive one and focused on missile warning.129 
Furthermore, in 1985 the United States and Canada signed the North American Air 
Defense Modernization. The main purpose of the agreement was to upgrade the 
obsolete DEW line into the North Warning System (NWS) and change the terms of 
the ownership of these strategic facilities. The new system was equipped with 34 
updated short-range radar stations and fifteen modern long-range radar stations, 
which would guarantee full security of North America. The NWS was designed to be 
managed by the Canadians on the territory of Canada, which was intended to 
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alleviate tensions resulting from the 1970s discussion of Canadian Arctic 
sovereignty. The DEW line was fully replaced in 1980s and early 1990s.130 
However, the American strategy for the Arctic focused not only on defensive 
objectives. Washington also had to remind Moscow about the American presence in 
the region. Thus they conducted Cruise Missile tests in the Canadian Arctic. Those 
military exercises provoked another round of public discussion in Ottawa.131 A tense 
situation between Canada and United States was very often used to the advantage of 
Moscow’s propaganda. Traffic of American oil tankers in the northern waters of 
Canada provoked yet another public debate over Ottawa’s sovereignty.132 This was 
cleverly used by Moscow as comments rapidly spread in Russian newspapers such 
as: “the U.S. military has been rapidly encroaching on the sovereignty of that state 
[Canada].”133 Despite these Russian voices, which were largely a reflection of the 
Canadian political moods, Ottawa was aware of its position between the two powers. 
In 1987, seeing the growing movement of Soviet and American ships on the northern 
waters, the Canadian government declared that it intended to acquire three or more 
submarines that were nuclear-powered. Two years later that decision would be 
changed in favor of preventive measures, but at the time it caused further turmoil in 
the Washington-Ottawa axis.134 
In October 1987, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev visited Murmansk, the largest city 
in the Arctic Circle, the most important harbor in the Russian North and home to the 
Red Banner Northern Fleet. In his very geopolitically-oriented speech, Gorbachev 
accused the United States of commencing a new arms race and expansionist attempts 
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in the North. He also emphasized the peaceful nature of the Soviet Union’s relation
with Scandinavian countries. It seems he truly believed that while Moscow was 
looking for peace in the region, Washington was preparing for
“One can feel here the 
immense potential of nuclear destruction concentrated aboard submarines and 
surface ships affects the political climate of the entire world and can be detonated by 
an accidental political-
militarization of this part of the world is assuming threatening dimensions.”
wanted to see the High North as
Soviet military capabilit
of  Soviet submarines (Image 14
At that point, Moscow was 
Baltic Sea to gain the Scandinavian countries
Meanwhile, anxiety of 
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 war, when he said: 
freezing breath of the "Arctic strategy" of the Pentagon. An 
military conflict in any other region of the world. The 
 a peaceful spot on the map, but in the 
ies in the region, it would be a peace under the vigilant eye 
). 
Image 14: Mikhail Gorbachev in Murmansk 
even ready to sacrifice the strategic significance of the 
’ approval for its activities in the Arctic. 
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Secretary in the Ministry of Defense, John Kristen Skogan said in the early 1980s: 
“If there was going to be some fighting in Europe, the chances of Norway being left 
out were nil.”136 The change in Soviet geopolitical orientation could have been 
dictated by awareness of growing anti-communist moods in Central and Eastern 
Europe, but it was also possible that it was a desperate attempt to maintain power at 
least in the Arctic region. Gorbachev’s initiative, although very important, did not 
change the inevitable.137 Four years later, the Soviet Union could not bear the 
economic, social and political challenges to its integrity and disintegrated into 
successor states, of which the largest, Russia, became the main heir of the Soviet 
Arctic political legacy. 
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PART III 
The Arctic after the Cold War 
The history of Arctic discovery shows how 
the development of human race has 
always been borne along by great illusions.138. 
Fridtjof Nansesn, 1911 
Polar explorer 
Past, Present and Future of the Arctic 
After the end of the Cold War, tensions between Washington and Moscow greatly 
eased, and the balance of power in the world completely relied on a unipolar 
international system, in which the United States became the dominant state in the 
international order. The Cold War clearly outlined the axis of conflict in the Arctic 
around the arms race and constant nuclear threat. Thus, the High North during the 
Cold War was an extremely vital arena of the political competition and, like no other 
place in the world, reflected the objectives of the Mutual Assured Destruction 
doctrine. The end of the Cold War brought a sharp decline in the importance of the 
Far North in the strategic plans of the Arctic countries. Hence, the first decade after 
the Cold War was primarily a period of dealing with the nuclear past, both in 
political as well as actual terms. 
The last decade of the twentieth century was largely a time of opening new forms of 
cooperation between East and West. However, many of the flashpoints already 
known from the times of the Cold War soon returned. In the early 1990s American 
documents from the Cold War period were declassified. That prompted the 
                                                            
138
 Emmerson, Future History, 3. 
61 
 
government in Copenhagen to conduct thorough research on the extent of U.S. 
military activity in Greenland. Bearing in mind the bomber accident of 1968, 
Denmark wanted to examine the issues of nuclear weapon deployment in nuclear -
free Danish Greenland. The results were reported as an international scandal, named 
by the media “Thulegate.” Within the next two years a comprehensive report 
analyzing the American actions in Greenland was published.139 The report confirmed 
that the United States deployed nuclear weapon in Greenland until 1965, but also 
revealed the details of the unrealized project Iceworm. Although the affair could 
adversely affect relations between allies within NATO, the report’s authors 
approached the topic very indulgently and diplomatically, explaining that the United 
States acted in good faith, and it was the Danish government to blame, since it had 
vaguely defined issues concerning American nuclear weapons deployment in the 
Danish Arctic in the bilateral agreement back in the 1950s.140 In the 1990s the Arctic 
was present in political discourse, but mostly through political reckoning with the 
past. 
Dealing with the Cold War past 
In the Arctic the 1990s was a period of melting ice between East and West, both 
politically as well as in reality. Military issues did not disappear from the discourse; 
however, they did recede into the background, while environmental issues come to 
the foreground. The attempt to take environmental issues of the High North to the 
international level had been initiated by Canada already during the third round of 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in the early 1970s. At that time 
Ottawa proposed that the coastal countries of the Arctic region should possess 
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special legal authority allowing them to control pollution in adjacent waters. In 1973, 
in the context of the looming oil crisis which turned upside down the world’s 
economy, new environmental standards became a luxury that no one could afford.141 
In face of serious economic problems which Moscow had to confront in 1990s, the 
Russian Navy was left underfunded. Once the pride of the Soviet navy, the Northern 
Fleet was seriously neglected. Lack of resources not only prevented new 
investments, but even the maintenance of the existing fleet. This situation awakened 
anxious comments about the danger of radioactive contamination from the neglected 
nuclear-powered submarines. The threat of nuclear weapons was replaced with a 
threat of nuclear pollution. At that point, evidence emerged that many of the nuclear 
reactors were in danger of being abandoned in the Arctic region. Furthermore, in 
1996 a Russian-Norwegian environmental organization, the Bellona Foundation, 
warned about the aging nuclear-powered submarines in the Kola Peninsula.142 
Another topic that raised much controversy was the atomic testing ground at Novaya 
Zemlya. It was never exactly estimated how big were the environmental damages 
caused by nuclear tests carried out on the archipelago, but environmentalists have 
suggested considerable negligence during the nuclear tests.143 Already in the mid-
nineties, the Russian Minister of Atomic Energy, Viktor Mikhaylov, refuted these 
accusations, arguing that the former testing ground was “as clean as New York, even 
cleaner.”144 Finally, after repeated interventions of the international community, the 
securitization and safety of Soviet-era nuclear infrastructure in the Arctic was done 
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largely with the help of European and American participation, becoming one of the 
first areas of cooperation between East and West in the Arctic region.145 
Nevertheless it is worth remembering that not only the Soviet Union polluted the 
Arctic region during the Cold War, but also the United States had its inglorious 
contribution. Speculation over the nuclear warheads of the crashed bomber near 
Thule Airbase in 1968 continued to stir controversy. Although Washington declared 
the scene of the crash as completely safe and properly secured, the consequences of 
this accident could be seen in the health condition of the local people for many 
years.146 Similarly, the abandoned DEW Line infrastructure, with its toxic waste and 
spilled oil, significantly affected the health of surrounding area’s indigenous 
peoples.147 
The issue of environmental protection is an extremely broad topic. Interestingly the 
issues that were not so complicated from the political and economic point of view 
found a common communication ground between the two sides of the Cold War. 
Signed in 1973, the Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears was the first such 
document, which created ground for cooperation between Canada, Denmark, 
Norway, the United States and the Soviet Union in the Arctic region. It was the first 
signal that the perception of the Arctic was beginning to change. Instead of the great, 
cold wasteland, the Arctic environment was starting to be recognized as 
exceptionally important. However the environmental issues returned with renewed 
force with the break-up of the Soviet Union.  
Environmental protection has since become the core of cooperation in the High 
North. In 1991, eight states whose territories bordered the Arctic Circle (Denmark, 
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Canada, Finland, Island, Norway, Russia, Sweden and the United States) signed the 
Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy. It provided a solid foundation for the 
Arctic Council established five years later, which become an international forum for 
the collaboration of Arctic countries. However, the idea was not new and was 
strongly advocated by Canada back in the eighties, but due to the ongoing 
ideological conflict, it seemed impossible to create that kind of organization.148 
Geopolitics after the Retreating Ice 
The change in the perception of the Arctic in 1990s also contributed to the science 
field. The fear of radioactive pollution resulted in the development of environmental 
research in the Arctic. Now, submarines could be peacefully used for research 
purposes. The increase of research in the Far North resulted in the study of the Cold 
War’s environmental effects in the region and the first signs of climate change. One 
of the scientists of the University of Washington in Seattle who analyzed the 
submarine data said, “The submarine study that compared the measurements in the 
1970s and 1980s with cruises in the 1990s was spectacular – they were the most 
significant and dramatic results we had.”149 The suspicion that the global climate was 
gradually warming was correct.150 The research conducted in the 1990s explains 
why, a decade later, the Arctic again proved to be a global flashpoint. 
NASA has conducted detailed studies of ice cover in the far north since 1979. 
Satellite images of the Arctic Circle have provided valuable data and allowed 
scientists to determine the exact annual variations of the polar ice sheet. The ice is 
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growing during the cold months, hidden in the darkness of the Arctic winter, and 
shrinks during the polar summer to reach its lowest level in the middle of September. 
In the years 1979-2012, a steady decline of 13 percent per decade was recorded.151 
Apart from satellite measurements, yet another test of the Arctic ice was conducted. 
Sonar scanning of the ice sheet relative to seabed, made by submarines, indicated a 
decrease in ice thickness by more than 40 percent compared to the levels recorded in 
1980. “Combining the loss in extent as well as in thickness, the total volume of 
Arctic ice is now a mere third of what it was in the 1980s.” 152 
For the Arctic environment the loss of the ice sheet means a catastrophic change, but 
climate change in the Far North has also had an enormous impact on global weather. 
Moreover, an ice-free Arctic will change not only the global environment, but can 
also affect other areas. Although these issues may be disquieting for 
environmentalists, they might be excellent news for economists. Global warming and 
the melting of the polar ice can also bring real benefits. Lack of ice means tangible 
benefits for transport, through the opening of new shipping routes that allow the 
shortening of traditional trade routes. An ice-free Arctic Ocean can reduce the 
distance between East Asia, Europe and North America. That means a real reduction 
of costs, which is also an opportunity to increase trade. 
Churchill, a small Canadian town, situated on Hudson Bay just below the Arctic 
Circle, is a great example of those changes. The small port played an extremely 
important role in the Arctic convoy shipments of grain to the Soviet Union during 
World War II. During the Cold War, because of the tense situation between the 
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superpowers, the port had no possibility to fulfill any role. The buildings fell into 
disrepair, and location’s uselessness from a strategic point of view obviated the need 
for the port’s reconstruction and its use for military purposes. In 1997, Pat Broe 
purchased the port facilities for a nominal sum. He did not anticipate the global 
warming of the subsequent decade. In that decade, the time during which the bay is 
covered with ice significantly shortened and raised hope for its navigability to as 
many as ten months a year. Today Churchill is back again is an important trade point. 
Moreover, it witnessed one of the most significant events in polar relations between 
Russia and West in the post-Soviet era. In October 2007 the Russian ship Kapitan 
Sviridov pulled into Churchill’s harbor and it was the first time when the port 
accepted goods shipped directly from Russia. The news quickly spread around the 
world and delegates from the Russian embassy were invited to announce that “Today 
represents the first successful shipment on the Arctic bridge”153 However, even with 
examples such as Churchill the primary economic advantage of an ice-free Far North 
was greater access to natural resources. 
The Arctic Black Gold Rush 
The end of the Cold War awakened hopes of peace and global prosperity. The 
twenty-first century has brought a much different reality than the world expected. Its 
first decade was the beginning of a new era, marked by the changing global balance 
of power, the emergence of new global powers, and the rise of new threats to 
international peace. While the perception of the Arctic was changing, it is worth 
noting that the strategic infrastructure of the Far North had not been removed. Polar 
countries were still aware of the strategic potential of the Arctic. However, the 
twenty-first century’s strategic imperatives looked different, largely based on energy 
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security, which was becoming increasingly difficult to ensure in times of increasing 
energy expenditures. 
In December 2008 Moscow presented a draft of its new security strategy until 2020. 
The text pointed that (sic) “international policy will focus on the access to the energy 
sources of the world, including the Middle East, Barents Sea, the Arctic Region, 
Caspian Sea and Central Asia. The struggle for the hydrocarbon resources can be 
developed to the military of confrontation as well, which can result with violation of 
balance on the Russia’s borders with the allies and increasing of nuclear 
countries.”154 This statement clearly points out that the natural resources in the new 
realities became what ideology had been during the Cold War. 
 
Image 15. 
According to the International Energy Outlook 2013 (IEO2013), the report of the 
U.S. Energy Information Agency anticipates that global energy consumption will 
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increase by 56 percent in the years 2010-2040. Global natural gas consumption is 
expected to increase by 1.7 percent per year, so that by 2040 world natural gas 
consumption is anticipated to increase by 64 percent, from 113 trillion cubic feet in 
2010 to 185 trillion cubic feet in 2040. Liquid fuels, mostly petroleum-based, remain 
the largest source of energy. The production of liquid fuels is expected to increase by 
28.3 million barrels per day between 2010 and 2040. And although a large part of 
rising energy consumption it is due to economic growth in developing countries, this 
will have an impact on the entire global economy.155 (Images 15 and 16). 
 
Image 16. 
At the beginning of the twenty-first century the price of a barrel of oil began to rise 
dramatically. In a short period of time it doubled. A debate on the looming oil crisis 
started along with the rush for new resources. According to Daniel Yergin, chairman 
of Cambridge Energy Research Associates, this was now “the fifth time that the 
world is said to be running out of oil. Each time… technology and the opening of the 
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new frontier areas has banished the specter of decline.”156 Yergin’s statement is key 
to understanding why the importance of the Arctic has grown so much in the twenty-
first century. The Arctic became a solution for the new era’s problems, as Yergin 
noted. While it is hard to point out the exact moment when the debate over the Arctic 
started and the Far North returned to the geopolitical map after a period of stagnancy 
in the 1990s, a correlation between rising oil prices and the intensification of political 
activities in the Arctic region can be easily detected. The rising global demand for oil 
and gas and its consequences of rising prices imply that activity in the region is 
expected to increase.157 
 
Image 17: Map of subsequent oilfield discoveries 
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Alaska was the first place to prove the existence of oil reserves in the Arctic region. 
Discovery of the oilfield in Prudhoe Bay in 1968 was the beginning of a new era in 
the Far North. Initially estimations were that the field held up to 10 billion barrels of 
oil, which made Prudhoe Bay the largest field ever discovered in North America and 
almost three times larger in term of production volume than the second largest 
oilfield in United States.158 The black gold rush in Alaska accelerated Canadian and 
Soviet exploration programs, which quickly became almost as promising as their 
American equivalent. At approximately the same time, oil was discovered in Yamalo 
– Nenets Autonomous Okrug and Nenets Autonomous Okrug in Russia and 
MacKenzie Delta in Canada. And even though in some Arctic areas, oil seeps have 
been known and used by indigenous people in Alaska, Canada and Russia for 
centuries, long before Prudhoe’s oilfield discovery, exploration had never been 
carried out on a large scale.159 (Image 17).  
The potential of the Arctic’s natural resources was noticed and oil companies started 
to drill in the late 1960s, but the real battle for the Arctic oil started in the twenty-
first century. However, a major obstacle was the transportation cost.160 All the 
discovered oilfields were far from any potential markets, thus they required advanced 
infrastructure for effective use. In the 1970s the construction of long pipelines 
started.161 It was already clear that the future history of resource extraction will be 
closely connected to the new technologies and infrastructure. Hence,  intensive work 
on technologies which would allow the exploration of new Arctic resources had 
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begun. Production activity grew rapidly once the transportation infrastructure was 
built (Image 18). 
 
Image 18: Annual and cumulative oil production in Arctic areas, by country. 
In 2007 the U.S. Geological Survey described the Far North as “the largest 
unexplored prospective area for petroleum remaining on Earth.” Indeed, it currently 
produces 13 percent of the world’s oil and about 30 percent of its gas.162 Of those 
amounts, most currently come from the Russian Arctic, about 80% of the oil and 
99% of the gas. However, there are still places in the Arctic that remain unexploited 
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and, according to the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme report, 
resources in Greenland, Iceland and the Faroe Islands might significantly change 
existing estimates, but not the prediction that “Oil and gas activities will remain part 
of the Arctic for many decades to come.” 163 Furthermore, these activities are 
expected to increase over the next several years. Global climate change is crucial to 
understanding the future of the Arctic. Diminishing sea ice and thawing of 
permafrost open new possibilities for the development of the region. Consequently 
“the construction of new infrastructure for development and particularly 
transportation will likely extend into areas currently without such human 
presence.”164 However, it has to be remembered that there are many factors which 
influence and control development activities in the Arctic. Most of the contemporary 
limitations are not scientific or technological. The ultimate control of the Arctic’s 
future lies in international relations. 
Who owns the Arctic? 
One of the main issues in the contemporary discourse over the Far North region is 
the question of who actually owns the Arctic. During the Cold War most of the 
Arctic was a military zone, and that question was asked locally in the context of 
specific territorial claims. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the danger of 
unleashing a nuclear inferno between East and West in the Arctic Ocean disappeared. 
However, in the twenty-first century, while the temperature of the Far North waters 
was increasing, the issue of international rights to those waters became extremely 
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hot. According to Charles Emmerson, “Over time, it is inevitable that climate change 
too will affect legal regimes in the Arctic.”165 
 
Image 19: Major Oil and Gas Provinces in the Arctic Region 
Territorial issues in the Arctic have two aspects, both based on territorial claims and 
the interpretation of the law of sea. The first one is connected with the acquisition of 
the rights to the huge amounts of oil and gas, since some parts of the Arctic region 
are the subject of territorial disputes. In this regard Canada, Denmark, Norway, 
Russia and the United States, the so-called Arctic Five, claim parts of polar waters as 
"national waters" or as "internal waters". The second aspect is the issue of maritime 
transport and the issue of international seaways on the Arctic water, which have risen 
because of the potential benefits of newly navigable routes and shipping traffic on 
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the waters previously considered closed for international trade due to ice cover, 
concerns over national security, and questions of environmental protection (Image 
19). 
When in 1930, the League of Nations failed to codify the international maritime law 
at the Hague conference, the question of national waters functioned on a basis that 
originated in the days when caravels still sailed the oceans.166 In effect, many 
countries have based their claims to territorial waters on unilateral declarations. 
Hence, for example, President Truman in September 1945 unilaterally extended 
United States jurisdiction over the continental shelf lying within 200 nautical miles 
off the U.S. coast, a model which has been followed by different nations in other 
parts of the world. 167 The problem of territorial waters remained open over the next 
decade. Thus in 1958 and again in 1960 the United Nation Conference on the Law of 
the Sea (UNCLOS) was held in Geneva. The two conferences resulted in four 
subsequent conventions, which came into force between 1962 and 1966. However, 
there were still some major questions which had not been solved and caused heated 
debate between different countries, even those allied in the Cold War struggle. In 
1973, in the Venezuelan capital of Caracas negotiations on the UNCLOS III began 
and lasted for another seven years. The UNCLOS process established specific sea 
territories concepts which have been used ever since. Its conventions set the limit of 
various claimed areas, measured from a carefully defined baseline. Even though the 
concepts were defined very precisely, they were still subject to different 
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interpretations. Furthermore, agreements between nations are not law in a sensu 
stricto, thus their enforcement gave rise to many difficulties. 
The legal situation of the Arctic Ocean is particularly difficult for international 
relations. Even though it is almost completely surrounded by large land masses, its 
middle part is far from any land and might be considered as “high sea”. However, 
since the definition of “high sea” requires both the right to, and the ability to 
navigate, it cannot be applied to Arctic Ocean since it is covered in ice. The issue of 
permanently or seasonally frozen waters has never been codified in international 
treaties. Thus the status of the Arcitc was frozen for decades in the Law of Sea. 
Paradoxically, climate change helps to cover Arctic issues with already codified law, 
but at the same time causes problems, since those laws were not written in the 
context of the Arctic’s unique waters.168 Divergent interpretations allow tCanada, 
Denmark, Norway and Russia to see the Arctic surrounding their shores as territorial 
or internal waters. Meanwhile, most of the countries of the European Union and the 
United States for various reasons would like to officially recognize the region as 
international waters. 
How the Local Became Global 
During the Cold War the complicated coastline of polar North America caused 
several territorial issues between the United States and Canada. One of them was the 
status of the Northwest Passage, the waterway allowing circumnavigation of the 
North American continent from the north. The U.S. perceived its important role in 
both civilian and military communication on the Arctic Ocean. They wanted to 
establish a status of international waters on this strategic corridor. Meanwhile 
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Canadians were seriously concerned about the increasing presence of American 
forces on their territorial waters and they saw the passage as an internal water area, 
subjected only to Ottawa’s control (Image 20). 
 
Image 20: The Northwest Passage 
Interestingly the debate over the Northwest Passage was accelerated by the discovery 
of oil in Alaska’s Prudhoe Bay. One year after the discovery, in 1969, the American  
Humble Oil & Refining Company decided to attempt a transit on the Northwest 
Passage and conduct the oil tanker Manhattan though the Arctic ice. It was an effort 
to prove that it was a navigable route.169 The American tanker, with special 
modifications which partly turned it into icebreaker, sailed from Prudhoe Bay to the 
East Coast of United States. For the first time in history, a large cargo vessel was 
used in the polar waters for a commercial objective. Unfortunately, this pioneering 
voyage turned into a sour point in relations between United States and Canada and 
had a dramatic impact on Ottawa’s policy toward the Far North. It opened many 
different questions in the international arena, including debates on the potential 
profits of the oil companies making extensive use of the passage and international 
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control of its navigation.170 Hence many of the issues undertaken in the UNCLOS III 
agenda upon Canadian request were related to the Arctic, for example the status of 
the Arctic Ocean or the legal definition of the Northwest Passage.171 Interestingly, 
even though the UNCLOS III was signed during the Cold War, Canada managed to 
convince the United Nations of its Arctic conception thanks to the support of 
Norway, Sweden and most of all, the Soviet Union.172  
The last of the three conferences on the Law of Sea did not change the international 
situation of the Northwest Passage. Sixteen years later, in 1985 the U.S. Coastguard 
ice-breaker Polar Sea made another transit of the passage. This time there were 
Canadian coastguard officers on the ship. Thus Ottawa, even despite the social 
protest, did not issue an official protest, but it did result in a statement about 
Canadian boundaries, which declared “Canada’s sovereignty in the Arctic is 
indivisible. It embraces land, sea and ice. It extends without interruption to the 
seaward-facing coasts of the Arctic islands. These islands are joined, and not divided, 
by the waters between them. They are bridged for most of the year by ice. From time 
immemorial Canada’s Inuit people have used and occupied the ice as they have used 
and occupied the land.”173 
Recurring debate over the status of this sea route led to another international 
agreement.174 In 1988 Washington and Ottawa signed the agreement on Arctic 
cooperation, which aimed to systematize their common interests in security. 
However, there was a specific point on the use of ice-breakers in Arctic waters. It 
allowed for transportation through the passage, hence solving the practical side of the 
                                                            
170
 Fairhall, Cold Front, 128. 
171
 Grant, Polar Imperative, 366. 
172
 Sale, Scramble for the Arctic, 150. 
173
 Ibid., 152. 
174
 The full name is the 1988 Agreement between the United States and Canada on Arctic 
Cooperation 
78 
 
problem, but the dispute over sovereignty has not been resolved.175 Nonetheless it is 
certain that “if melting ice permits, maritime transport along the North-West Passage 
will play an important role.”176  
After the Cold War not only climate changed. In a situation where the world is no 
longer divided only between two superpowers, and new players have entered the 
international game, it is clear that the status of Northwest Passage will be of interest 
for the whole world, not just the United States and Canada. In addition, the 
aforementioned example of Churchill in Canada shows perfectly how the Northwest 
Passage became a global issue. The widely announced “Arctic bridge” opened in 
2007 was also the first time when two major Arctic Sea routes, the Northwest 
Passage and the Northern Sea Route (or the Northeast Passage) were connected, 
enhancing the global network of trade links.177 
To understand the distinction between local and global disputes over the Arctic it is 
crucial to understand that territorial disputes between the United States and Canada 
included much more than just a debate over the Northwest Passage. Another 
unsolved territorial question lies in the Beaufort Sea, where the dispute over a piece 
of coastline dates back to the days when Alaska belonged to Russian Empire and 
Canada to the British Empire. Although it seemed that the problem was solved in the 
fifties of the twentieth century, with the discovery of natural resources in these 
waters, the issue exploded again.178 This dispute is a perfect example of a local 
territorial dispute. While the Northwest Passage is an important subject for many 
global players, the Beaufort Sea disagreement is just a local territorial dispute. 
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Today, the Arctic Ocean is an area where forces of the five main players clash. This 
so-called Arctic Five, which are five countries with the greatest influence in the 
Arctic (Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia and the United States), have all claimed 
territorial rights in the region. But right behind them there are other forces that also 
seek a role to play a role in the Arctic, countries which nether historically nor 
geographically have had much in common with the Far North, such as China, 
Germany, Italy, Spain or Poland and of course the entire European Union as a 
separate actor. Along with state actors, transnational companies have entered the 
Arctic game and they are ready to compete with each other for the best investments. 
Anglo-Dutch Shell, Russian Rosneft, Norwegian Statoil, American Exxon Mobil and 
Italian Eni are companies that have invested enormous amounts of money in the 
region and created strong lobbies which have to be reckoned with.179 
The Russian Ocean 
Some of territorial disputes in the Arctic are rooted in contemporary realities very 
different from those of the Cold War while others are completely new. After the 
ratification of UNCLOS, each country has been assigned a ten-year period to request 
an extension of claims to the continental shelf, which provides exclusive right to 
natural resources lying on the bottom of the sea belonging to the shelf.180 Norway 
ratified the convention in 1996, Canada in 2003, Denmark a year later. Russia, it is 
important to remember, ratified UNCLOS in 1997.181 Each of these countries upon 
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ratification of the Convention launched research projects which were designed to 
establish the basis for claims for extended seabed of the continental shelf. 
In 2001 Russia submitted its first claim to the UNCLOS continental shelf 
commission. This was one of many signs that Russia was planning to return to the 
international arena as an important player. The Russian proposal involved the 
establishment of new outer borders of Russia's continental shelf, which would extend 
beyond the 200-mile zone approved by UNCLOS. The new Russian territorial 
request included a huge part within the Russian Arctic, reaching the North Pole. The 
main argument in favor of such a change was the claim to the eastern part of the 
Lomonosov ridge, which as an underwater ridge could be considered an extension of 
the Eurasian continent. A year later, in 2002 the UN commission asked Russia to 
submit additional evidence to support the claim.182 
Additional research was conducted in 2007 and 2008 as part of the Russian Program 
for the International Polar Year (IPY). It is definitely not a coincidence that Moscow 
planned the polar research to celebrate the IPY. The International Polar Year is a 
large scientific program which focuses on the Arctic and Antarctic. It is organized by 
the International Council for Science and the World Meteorological Organization. 
Although 2007-2008 IPY was the third time when celebrations took place under that 
name, it was actually the fourth polar year, since the 1957-1958 International 
Geophysical Year was de facto the International Polar Year in a politically correct 
version adapted to Cold War realities.183 There is no confirmation, but it may be 
presumed that in the fifties the term polar was abandoned due to the complicated 
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situation of the two polar regions. At the time the situation in the Antarctic was still 
not regulated by the Antarctic treaty, which was signed in 1959 and officially entered 
into force 1961.184 Meanwhile the extremely tense military situation in the Arctic, 
which was described earlier, made scientific research impossible (Image 21. and  
22.). 
 
Image 21. and 22.: Official  logo of IPY and IGY 
Exactly fifty years after sending into space the first artificial satellite, Sputnik-1, as a 
celebration of the International Geophysical Year, Russia had decided once again to 
recall the strategic importance of the Arctic region. On July 10, 2007 Akademik 
Fyodorov, a Russian diesel-electric scientific research vessel was launched from St. 
Petersburg. Akademik Fyodorov started the Arktika 2007 expedition equipped with 
two MIR Deep Submergence Vehicles and guided with the nuclear icebreaker 
Rossiya. The expedition aimed to conduct the first ever crew descent on the ocean 
floor at the North Pole. Of course, it was within the framework of research related to 
the 2001 Russian territorial claims. In less than a month from the beginning of the 
expedition, on August 2, 2007, MIR-1 reached a depth of nearly 14,000 feet below 
the surface of the ice, reaching the bottom of the North Pole. The expedition left at 
the bottom of pole the titanium Russian flag. It happened exactly ten years after the 
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ratification of UNCLOS, when Moscow again symbolically announced to the world 
its claim to the North Pole.185 (Image 22). 
 
Image 22: Titanium Russian Flag on the Bottom of the North Pole 
This was reminiscent of Cold War events in many dimensions. The expedition 
officially corrected depth measurements of the seabed under the North Pole made by 
the USS Nautilus in 1958, which were considered as the first reliable measurements 
ever made.186 The crew taking part in the expedition after its return was greeted with 
the greatest honors by the highest national officials, just as had the American crew of 
Operation Sunshine. A year later, coincidentally on the fiftieth anniversary of the 
success of Nautilus, the Arktika 2007 crew was awarded the highest national 
award.187 Above all, it was a message that Moscow intended to fight for its dominant 
role in the Arctic Ocean, just like during the Cold War. 
The international response appeared immediately, Canadian Foreign Minister Peter 
MacKay concluded, “You can’t go around the world these days dropping a flag 
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somewhere. This isn’t the 14th or 15th century.”188  U.S. State Department spokesman 
Tom Casey said that he was “not sure whether they’ve put a metal flag, a rubber flag 
or a bedsheet on the ocean floor,” and “either way, it doesn’t have any legal standing 
or effect on this claim.”189 The Foreign Minister of Russia, Sergey Lavrov, quickly 
responded, “I was amazed by my Canadian counterpart's statement that we are 
planting flags around. We’re not throwing flags around. We just do what other 
discoverers did. The purpose of the expedition is not to stake whatever rights of 
Russia, but to prove that our shelf extends to the North Pole.”190 The irreverent 
response of Canadians, found its justification six years later, when in December 
2013, Ottawa submitted to the UN an official request to make a proclamation about 
the North Pole. The Foreign Minister John Baird explained that “We are determined 
to ensure that all Canadians benefit from the tremendous resources that are to be 
found in Canada's far north.”191 
In 2008 the new president of the Russian Federation, Dimitry Medvedev, announced 
that he viewed the Arctic as a “region of strategic importance”, which was turning 
into the Russian “resource base for the twenty-first century.” It was clear that Russia 
was eager to continue its expansion up north.192 The Russians are trying to 
emphasize their presence in the Far North in any number of possible ways. In 2012, 
they announced that they wanted to rename the Arctic Ocean to the Russian Ocean. 
The controversial idea to change the name was proposed by the University of 
Lomonosov professor Nikolai Pawliuk. He argued that the pioneering, exploratory 
and scientific contribution of the Russians in exploring the Arctic were grounds for 
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the name change. In addition, many other geographical names are aligned with a 
specific country, as in the case of the Indian Ocean and the Sea of Japan. It can also 
be explained with Charles Emmerson’s words, which refer to the Soviet era, but are 
surprisingly relevant to the present day: “Outside the Soviet Union, as inside the 
Soviet Union, development of the Arctic was presented largely as a positive and even 
heroic accomplishment, rather than as a shameful and ultimately destructive episode 
in Arctic history.”193  This naming proposal not only re-awakens discussion about 
Russian involvement in the Arctic region, but also perfectly reflects the entire 
Russian policy towards the High North.194 
  
                                                            
193
 Emmerson, Future History, 50. 
194
 „Ocean „Arktyczny” czyli „Rosyjski”?”, Kresy24.pl, Wschodnia Gazeta Codzienna 
URL: http://kresy24.pl/12412/ocean-arktyczny-czyli-rosyjski/ 
85 
 
The New Cold War 
It might have been expected that in the twenty-first century international realities 
would have changed so dramatically that the military dimension of the Arctic activity 
would no longer exist. Many elements from the Cold War appeared again, however, 
albeit in different form. Another military era was approaching in the history of the 
Arctic. According to Rob Huebert, member of the Canadian Defense and Foreign 
Affairs Institute and a professor of Political Science at the University of Calgary, 
“All of the Arctic states have begun rebuilding their military forces and capabilities 
in order to operate in the region. Personnel are undertaking Arctic training exercises; 
submarines that can operate in ice are being developed or enhanced; icebreakers are 
being built; and so forth.”195 
Since 2001, many of the military operations in the Arctic region officially have been 
motivated by the undermined international security order after the attacks on the 
World Trade Center. The changed security landscape in the early twenty-first century 
meant that the threat might come from non-state actors, rather than from other 
nation-states. Increased accessibility to and activity in the region led to many anxious 
opinions about the potential use of northern sea routes for smuggling weapons, 
drugs, and even terrorist attacks.196 However, it is more likely that the warning 
systems built during the Cold War remained on twenty-four-hour alert for a different 
reason.197 Strengthening natural security forces in the Arctic region remains on 
important objective for the circumpolar countries, because even though the twenty-
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first century is a peaceful time for the Arctic, military force continues to back claims 
to sovereignty in the region.198 
At the beginning of the new century the Russian Navy was at its weakest point in 
history. On 12 August 2000 during the summer maneuvers of the Northern Fleet in 
the Barents Sea, the nuclear-powered submarine Kursk sank, with a crew of 118 
men. Kursk was one of the first submarines produced in the post-Soviet era. Just a 
year before the accident, Kursk was considered a jewel of the Russian fleet and its 
crew was one of the most honored in Russia. The ship sank in largely unknown 
circumstances, probably as a result of failure of one of its torpedoes.199 The tragic 
fate of Kursk reverberated in international relations. It was announced as a severe 
embarrassment of the Russian Navy and a symbolic climax of the steep decline of 
Russian military capability in the Arctic. “Everything about the sinking of the Kursk 
– from the initial disinformation spread by Russian admiralty, to the slow response 
from Moscow, to failure to accept offers of foreign assistance that might have saved 
lives – reeked of mismanagement.”200  
However since 1999, an upward trend started in Russia’s military spending. It rose 
significantly in 2012, with a real increase of 16 percent.201 This trend was also 
reflected in the Arctic. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute “Military interest in the region does exist. Canada, Denmark and Norway 
are moving forces into their respective Arctic regions and acquiring weapons and 
equipment for specific Arctic use. Russia has also started to expand 
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its Arctic military capabilities, while the USA’s Arctic security concerns still play 
only a minor role in its overall defence policy.”202 
Along with the significant Arktika 2007 expedition, Moscow started to send political 
and military signals to other powers, most obviously to the United States, to respect 
Russia’s national interest in the Arctic region. In August 2007, Russians conducted 
large-scale military exercises over the Arctic. Twelve gigant Tupolev 95 strategic 
bombers, the same aircraft which dropped  the Tsar Bomba over the Novaya Zemlya, 
flew over the vicinity of the Bering Strait as a demonstration of Russian military 
power.203 It was clearly a reflection of deeply rooted Russian fears, expressed two 
years earlier in the Russian newspaper Pravda: “It has recently transpired that the US 
administration plans to launch an extensive invasion in the Arctic region (…) the 
USA particularly plans to build airbases in Alaska while US oil giants intend to 
develop the Arctic shelf (…) it is obvious that the development of the USA’s new 
objective in the Arctic region will be conducted within the scope of the nation’s 
ambition to dominate the world. This intention is officially registered in the US 
National Security Strategy. The document entitles Washington to possess all 
necessary resources to influence the situation in all key regions of the globe. The 
Arctic has become one of such regions.”204 Thus, not surprisingly the exercises held 
in 2007 were only a prelude to what Russia demonstrated in the following years.  
Starting in 2012, over the next three years Russia plans to spend more than 21 billion 
rubles for construction and modernization of its Arctic marine infrastructure, 
including modern seaports. Moscow has also recommended upgrading of the navy in 
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the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation, including a new series of ice-class patrol 
ships, a squadron of ice-breaking warships, and special Arctic troops provided with 
new equipment.205 In July 2011, Vladimir Putin, then the Russian prime minister, 
said that "Russia will defend its strategic interests in the Arctic and expand its 
presence there." Meanwhile Russian Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov 
announced plans of armaments sector production that aimed to protect the resources 
of the Arctic Circle in the territories claimed by Russia. The draft budget for all 
2013-15 military expenditures includes plans for further growth in nominal terms of 
slightly more than 40 percent by 2015. According to the Stockholm International 
Peace Research Institute, “the Increases come as Russia implements the ambitious 
2011-20 State Armaments Programme and undertakes a wide-ranging reform of its 
armed forces.”206 
Each of the polar players have demonstrated with their actions that the Arctic region 
has for them utmost importance. Many of them have emphasized the strategic 
position of the Arctic region in their official policy. The Canadian government has 
made protecting and strengthening Canada’s Arctic sovereignty a priority. It is 
officially included in Canada’s defense policy. Ottawa’s Arctic policy is specified in 
the government’s Northern Strategy created in 2009. The Danish Defense Agreement 
essentially highlights the changing geostrategic significance of the Arctic. In 
addition, a special Arctic strategy was adopted in 2011. Copenhagen also approved a 
plan for setting up the Arctic Military Command in 2009. Norwegian defense policy 
is based on the 2007 Soria Moria Declaration on International Policy. According to 
the Norwegian statement, the northern part of the country has become a priority in 
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national defense. Not all of those countries have equal capabilities to achieve the 
ambitious goals of their Arctic policies, but they will most definitely try. Meanwhile, 
the United States is the only country with the required capabilities to play the most 
important role in the region, but it is the only country out of Arctic Five which did 
not place Arctic strategy in its highest priorities of its defense plans. In a document 
outlining security priorities for the 21st century presented in January 2012, the Arctic 
was not mentioned at all. The American 2009 Arctic Policy plays only a minor role 
in overall US defense policy. The US National Security Strategy, created by the 
administration of President Barack Obama in 2010, and the US National Military 
Strategy from 2011 mention the Far North only a few times.207 Will such a mix of 
different interests result in the outbreak of a New Cold War, which the media are so 
eager proclaim? 
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CONCLUSION 
The contemporary strategic position of the Arctic in the twenty-first century seems to 
suggest extremely strong similarities to the Cold War. However, comparison to the 
Cold War usually meets with the opinion that the perspective of "an armed conflict in 
the Arctic is highly unlikely and that the Arctic is one of the most stable regions in 
the world."208 Nevertheless it might be said, that this is exactly what makes that 
comparison so accurate. During the Cold War, the situation in the Arctic perfectly 
reflected all the tensions between the superpowers. Bearing in mind the doctrine of 
Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), it was the only area in the world where real 
military conflict could not break out. On the other hand, there is the opinion that “the 
possibility of future conflict cannot be completely overruled,” although there is a 
strong conviction that it would “be the result of spill-over from conflicts 
elsewhere.”209 Such a possibility is even more similar to the Cold War realities. 
Moreover, the rhetoric and actions of the Russians in the Arctic are a direct legacy of 
the Soviet era. Russia wants to be seen as the only legitimate claimant to the Arctic. 
On 2 May 2013 the Russians announced that they were the first to cross the North 
Pole from Russia to Canada on military amphibious seacraft. Half a year later, before 
the Winter Olympic Games in 2014, the Olympic torch on its way to Sochi was taken 
to the most interesting corners of Russia, the highest peak in Europe, Mount Elbrus, 
and the depths of Lake Baikal. And most interestingly, it was taken to the North Pole 
by a group of scientists and explorers. The final torchbearer, Artur Chilingarov, was 
the member of Arktika 2007 expedition. Furthermore, Moscow used the occasion to 
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announce that the ice-breaker which took the torch “set a new record taking just 91 
hours and 12 minutes to travel from Murmansk to the planet's most central point.”210 
The Russian Federation, just like its predecessor, will never lose a chance to prove its 
point (Image 23). 
 
Image 23: Olympic Torch on the North Pole, Artur Chilingarov in the middle 
During the Cold War, as it is today, the Arctic was a separate area of rivalry between 
the superpowers. Despite the fact that today's debate is based on different issues-- 
sovereignty in the region, potential access to natural resources, and the status of 
international waters—there is still a strong military component to the competing 
interests. It might even be said that the contemporary portrait of the Arctic region is 
dominated with "the capabilities of the Arctic littoral states as significant military 
build-ups and potential threats to security," but what significantly differentiates the 
contemporary situation from the history of the Cold War is the issue of the 
environment, which like never before is vulnerable to irreparable loss and 
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destruction.211 And even though “it’s not really climate change that will change who 
owns what in Arctic,” perhaps who owns it will save the Arctic.212 
The fact that the intensification of Arctic rivalries went on its own path in 
international relations perfectly demonstrates the strategic importance of the Arctic 
region. When it comes to predicting the future, historians are usually wrong, but the 
Arctic is a sure bet to be the scene of international competition for years to come. 
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